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We are witnessing something unprecedented: Water no longer flows downhill. 
It flows towards money (Robert F. Kennedy Jr.) 
 
What we call man￿s power over nature turns out to be a power exercised by 
some men over other men with nature as its instrument (C.S. Lewis, The 




Introduction: Water and the MDGs 
 
 
Providing safe and clean water to communities is not exactly rocket science: 
the basic technologies and engineering principles are known and mastered (although 
there is always scope for improvement of course), management systems understood, 
aquatic bio-chemical and physical processes well comprehended. Despite the relative 
technological and managerial ease of providing clean water for all and of evacuating 
and treating wastewater, it is remarkable that more than one billion people worldwide 
are still suffering from inadequate, unreliable (both in quantity and quality) and/or 
difficult access to clean water and almost two billion form unsatisfactory sanitation.  
While the humanitarian and socio-economic costs of inadequate water and sanitation 
services are well known, progress in alleviating water problems remains 
excruciatingly and unacceptably slow. The annual number of premature deaths or the 
persistence of debilitating conditions actually suffered by the poor of the world as a 
result of inadequate water supply far outweigh even the most pessimistic predictions 
of the human consequences of global warming. Yet, it would be remarkably easy to 
remedy this. With the possible exception of very arid regions, conditions of 
problematic water access have little, if anything at all, to do with water availability or 
absolute scarcity. It usually is a problem of access and equitable distribution of the 
available resources. What need to be understood better, therefore, is not how to bring 
water to people, but, rather, why it is that some social groups do not have adequate 
access to water and sanitation, while others do.   
 
While the MDGs are committed to a significant increase of the number of 
people that have improved access to clean water and adequate sanitation, particularly 
to the poor, it can now be confidently predicted that, unless a significant effort is 
made from the part of national and trans-national institutions, conditions will only 
have improved marginally, if at all, by 2015. Despite rhetorical commitment and 
political support, eradicating water poverty meets with significant barriers and 
difficulties.     
 
This background paper will address a relatively neglected aspect of the water 
problem. In particular, attention will be paid to the relationship between social power 
and water circulation and water access. In other words, it will be argued that access to 
or exclusion from access to water is largely determined by relative power positions of 
individuals and social groups vis-￿-vis each other. In other words, we argue that a 
focus on ￿the poor￿ is not necessarily particularly helpful in assessing and 
understanding processes of access to or exclusion from access to water and sanitation. 
The key question is to understand why some groups in particular social and 
geographical location have unlimited access to water while others have no or   5
unsatisfactory access. Throughout the paper, selected case studies will substantiate 
and illustrate the key arguments. We shall pay relatively little attention to the 
problematic conditions of water access for many people around the world and the 
difficulties encountered in changing this condition. This is sufficiently known (Gleick 
1993; UNHSP 2003). This paper￿s focus is on the social power relations that produce 
decidedly uneven conditions through which socio-spatially stratified water access 
conditions are actively produced and maintained. 
 
We shall consider the terrestrial part of the hydrological cycle as 
fundamentally a hydro-social cycle (Swyngedouw, Ka￿ka, and Castro 2002). The 
water flows embodied in the networks that function as conduits for this cycle would 
narrate many interrelated tales: of social and political actors and the powerful socio-
ecological processes that produce urban and regional spaces; of participation and 
exclusion; of rats and bankers; of water-borne disease and speculation in water-
industry related futures and options; of chemical, physical and biological reactions 
and transformations; of the global hydrological cycle and global warming; of uneven 
geographical development; of the political lobbying and investment strategies of dam 
builders; of urban land developers; of the knowledges of engineers; of the passage 
from river to urban reservoir. The rhizome of underground and surface water flows, of 
streams, pipes and networks is a powerful metaphor for processes that are both social 
and ecological (Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000). Water is a ￿hybrid￿ thing that captures 
and embodies processes that are simultaneously material, discursive and symbolic. 
Water networks connect the most intimate of socio-spatial relations, inserts them into 
a mesmerising political-economy of urban, national and international development, 
and is part of a chain of local, regional, national and global circulations of water, 
money, texts and bodies. In this sense, water embodies bio-chemical and physical 
properties, cultural and symbolic meanings, and socio-economic characteristics 
simultaneously and inseparably. These multiple metabolisms of water are structured 
and organized through socio-natural power relations ￿ relations of domination and 
subordination, of access and exclusion, of emancipation and repression ￿ which then 
become etched into the flow and metabolisms of circulating water. This circulation of 
water is embedded in and interiorises a series of multiple power relations along 
ethnic, gender and class lines (see (Swyngedouw 1996a)). These situated power 
relations, in turn, swirl out and operate at a variety of interrelated geographical scale 
levels, form the scale of the body upward to the political-ecology of the city to the 
global scale of uneven development. The capturing, sanitizing, and bio-chemical 
metabolising of water to produce ￿urban￿ drinking or agricultural irrigation water 
simultaneously homogenizes, standardises, and transforms it into a commodity as well 
as into the real-abstract homogenized qualities of money power in its manifold 





The report consists of the following parts: 
 
1) Water Access and Water Security: the Facts 
 
2) Water Power: a Political Ecology Perspective 
   6
3) Water and Social Power: A review 
 
a)  Water and the State 
b)  Water, Money, and the City 
 
4) The Politics of Exclusion 
 
5) The Shifting Political-Economy of Water: Politics of Exclusion and 
Struggles for Access 
 
6)  Cracks in the Mirror: the Contradictions of Water Privatisation 
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1. Water access and water security: the facts 
 
A general overview will be provided of the conditions of uneven access to 
water resources, primarily (but not exclusively) in urban contexts. This part will be 
kept short and factual, primarily to provide the context for the analysis presented in 
the paper. The main objective of this part is to show that, except under specific 
conditions, there is no absolute scarcity of water, but rather that access to water is 
socially unevenly distributed.  
It is of course well known that a large number of the world￿s population lack 
access to water supply and sanitation. World Health Organization data show indeed 
that 1.1 billion people have no water supply and almost 2.5 billion lack basic 
sanitation services. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, this condition has only improved 
marginally during the 1990s in relative terms and has basically stagnated in absolute 
terms. Moreover, the data are almost certainly underestimated, particularly with 
respect to water and sanitation data for urban areas. There is a high percentage of 
urban residents who do not have in-door piped water and are consequently dependent 
on other means for accessing water such standpipes, wells, and, most often, informal 
private water vending. This makes the urban water problem particularly acute as both 
quality and quantity of water is limited on the one hand and cost (both in terms of 
time and of price) is very high on the other.  
 
Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the unreliable or 
difficult access to water has very little if anything at all to with absolute scarcity of 
water. This is abundantly clear with respect to urban areas. With a few possible 
exceptions, all major cities produce a sufficient volume of potable water to satisfy 
more than satisfactory human health and sanitation conditions. As Table 2 shows, 
average per capita water consumption in Latin American cities is high and is 
comparable to the average per capita consumption of water in cities in the developed 
world. In urban environments, therefore, there is no evidence of an absolute scarcity 
of potable or treated water. However, as Table 3 shows, the available water is 
distributed in a highly unequal manner. A relatively small percentage of the 
population consumes most of the available water. For people depending on water 
vending (usually water coming from the urban water system), their consumption share 
is very small indeed. Moreover, the water price charged by water vendors, which are 
always local micro-entrepreneurs, is invariably significantly higher than the water 
tariff of the ￿official water company (see Table 4). 
 
To the extent, therefore, that urban residents lack access to sufficient, clean, 
and affordable water is solely a question of relative scarcity as a result of uneven 
distribution. Since the existing distribution system is socio-technically constructed, 
this relative scarcity is totally socially produced and does not inhere in the absolute 
availability of water. The mobilisation of scarcity, therefore, serves primarily 
ideological and political purposes, but does not adequately reflect existing social 
inequalities in accessibility. In the penultimate section, a critique of the ￿politics of 
scarcity￿ will be provided, with particular emphasis on the political role of mobilising 
￿scarcity￿ as a principle problem with respect to water resources.    8
Table 1. Access to Water Supply and Sanitation by Region, 1990 and 2000 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                                   1990 Population           2000 Population 
                  (millions)                 (millions) 
   -------------------------------   ------------------------------- 
Region   Total   Population     Total   Population   
  Population  Unserved   Population  Unserved 
GLOBAL 
Urban Water Supply  2,292        114      2,845        174 
Rural Water Supply  2,974     1,013      3,210        926 
Total  Water  Supply  5,266     1,127    6,055     1,100 
 
Urban Sanitation  2,292        415      2,845        402 
Rural  Sanitation  2,974     1,947    3,210     2,001 
Total  Sanitation  5,266     2,362    6,055     2,403   
   
AFRICA 
Urban Water Supply     197          31         253          44 
Rural Water Supply     418        235         487        256 
Total Water Supply     615        266         784        300 
    
Urban Sanitation     197          30        297          46    
Rural Sanitation     418        212        487        267   
Total Sanitation     615        242        784        313 
 
ASIA 
Urban Water Supply   1,029          57      1,352          98 
Rural Water Supply   2,151        718      2,331        595 
Total Water Supply   3,180        775      3,683        693 
 
Urban Sanitation  1,029        339      1,352        297 
Rural  Sanitation  2,151     1,655    2,331     1,619     
Total  Sanitation  3,180     1,994    3,683     1,916 
 
LATIN AMERICA and CARIBBEAN 
Urban Water Supply      313          26         391           29 
Rural Water Supply       128          56         128           49 
Total Water Supply      441           82         519           78 
 
Urban Sanitation     313          46         391           51  
Rural Sanitation     128          78         128           66  
Total Sanitation     441         124        519         117 
 
Source: World Health Organization (2000) Global Water Supply and Sanitation 
Assessment 2000 Report. Geneva.  
   9
Table 2. Average municipal water consumption in Latin American cities. 
 
C i t y         W a t e r   c o n s u m p t i o n  
         (lcd  =  litres  per  capita  per  day)   
 
      source:  Anton        source:  World  Bank   
 
Buenos  Aires       630     
Havana      500   100 
Maracaibo       475   
C￿rdoba       435   
Guayaquil       429   261 
San  JosØ       423   
Monterrey       404   
Mexico City                 360 - 527  
Lima-Callao       359   211 
Curitiba       345   
Medell￿n       340   
Guadalajara       314   
BogotÆ        304   
Santiago                 300 - 555   286 
Caracas                 300 - 388  
Montevideo       289   
Quito                             286 - 301  
Sao Paulo                 270 - 293  
Salvador       266   186 
Belo  Horizonte     261   
Cali        237   
La  Paz        177       73 
Rio de Janeiro                188 - 684   299 
Asunci￿n                 160 - 350   236 
Barranquilla       148   
C o c h a b a m b a        1 3 0
a
      43 
Source: Anton (1993: 156); World Bank (1998: 278-279) 
a
Crespo (2002: 122).   10
Table 3. Relationships between proportion of water consumed and percentage of 
households, as well as total water production per capita in selected Latin 
American cities. 
 
City    Percentage   Percentage     Water  produced 
      of population    of water      per capita per 
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Espinoza (1988: 4); 
d
Bernal (1991: 153-154); 
e
calculated on the basis of Icaza and Rodriguez (1988: 62);
 fCrespo (2002: 121).   11
Table 4. Price multiples and water prices charged by water vendors, mid 1970s-
1980s and 2001 (unless otherwise indicated). 
 
City      Country    Multiples of              Water price
b
 
      w a t e r   c h a r g e d       U . S . $ / m
3
  
      by  Public  Water       1988 




Port au Prince   Haiti           17-100 
Tegucigalpa    Honduras         16-34 
Lima    Peru                    17   20-50  intis 
Barranquilla    Colombia            28         2.00 
Mexico City    Mexico          40-114      400 pesos 
Guayaquil   Ecuador         200-300    2.11-3.16 
Quito    Ecuador                   27   1.70-2.00 
Barquisimeto   Venezuela       1.00-1.40 






Baranquilla   Colombia           10-12    5.50-6.40 
Guatamala City  Guatamala         7-10      2.70-4.50 
Lima      Peru           8-10          2.40  
Guayaquil    Ecuador                      3.20  
Cochabamba
c    Bolivia                 5        2.40  (2002) 
El Alto 
d    Bolivia               16        3.30  (2000) 
 
 
Data from McIntosh and Yæiguez (1997)
f 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Bandung         14            3.60 
Bangkok              28.94 
D h a k a         1 0             0 . 8 4  
Karachi                                1.14 
K a t h m a n d u        1 1             2 . 6 1  
M a n i l a                    2 . 1 5  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: 
   a
 World Bank (1989: Table 3.2.,p 70). 
      
b
 VÆsconez (1991: 51) 
      
c Crespo (2002a: 111 and 117)   
      
d  Komives (2001) 
               
e Solo (2001: 2)  
      
f  McIntosh and Yæiguez (1997), cited in UNHSP(2003: 71) 
Data for Barranquilla (date 1989) from Bernal (1991: 154), for Mexico City (date 
1983) from Bataillon and PanabiŁre (1988) and for Guayaquil from field work (1993); 
Data for Quito’s multiple (in 1987) from Vasconez (1988a) and for Lima’s water price 
(date June 1987) from Espinoza and Oliden (1988: 57).   12
Access to water for consumption for rural residents is equally highly 
problematic and uneven. There are a variety of reasons for this. Under particular geo-
climatic conditions, local or regional problems of scarcity may arise. Most of times, 
however, the cost of infrastructure and the average cost of supplying clean water to 
sparsely settled communities are prohibitively expensive. The latter holds of course 
true both for public and private service provision. Rural water supply is almost 
invariably subsidised and the introduction of market principles in rural water supply 
systems is even more difficult than in urban environments. The fixed capital 
investment cost is high while potential returns and profit are rather low, uncertain, and 
unreliable.  
  Both these examples suggest already that the problem of water access and 
water control is primarily a question of purchasing power, available capital, and the 
direction of capital investment. Or, in other words, access to water is invariably 
articulated through the money nexus and, consequently, to the social power 
relationships through which money and capital are organised and distributed 
 
  If anything, the relationship between social power and water access is even 
more acute for agricultural systems that are dependent on hydraulic infrastructures 
and irrigation. As large-scale hydraulic infrastructures are invariably built and 
organised through the state, there is close relationship between capital investment, 
state power, and the distribution of and access to irrigation waters. In addition to the 
obvious conflicts between different water uses and between local residents and dam 
constructions with their inevitable displacements of people, the subsequent 
distribution of the irrigation waters is also reflective of social power relations. Not 
only do dams and irrigation channels radically change earlier flows of water (and their 
uses) but also produces new uses, new structures of access, and new forms of water 
distribution. Water access and water security are profoundly transferred by irrigation 
schemes. While access and use is massively improved for some, it is often made 
worse for others. The grand hydraulic works that produced California￿s agricultural 
success is a case in point as is the hydro-modernisation that characterised the rapid 
economic development of Spain during the second half of the 20
th century. Indeed, 
none of these changes are power neutral. We shall return to this theme as well in the 
remainder of this paper. But first, I shall outline the conceptual framework that will 
guide the remainder of the paper. 
 
   13
2. Water Power: A political ecology perspective 
 
Before addressing the question of social power as it articulates with water 
distribution and access, attention will be paid to the theoretical/conceptual apparatus 
that permits formulating resource questions in terms of social, political, and economic 
power relations. Drawing on a wide range of literatures related to political ecology, 
this section will chart how political-ecological analysis inserts the matter of social 
power within resource uncertainty (see also (Keil 2000); (Peet and Watts 1996);   
(Swyngedouw, Ka￿ka, and Castro 2002); (Heynen, Kaika, and Swyngedouw 2005)). 
Political ecology considers socio-ecological metabolisms to be inherently part-
political processes and, consequently, an integral part of any political or social 
project. Political visions are, therefore, necessarily also ecological visions; any 
political project must, of necessity, also be an environmental project (and vice versa) 
(Harvey 1996):   
 
1.  Environmental and social changes co-determine each other (Norgaard 1994). 
Processes of socio-environmental metabolic circulation transform both social and 
physical environments and produce social and physical milieus with new and 
distinct qualities. In other words, environments are combined socio-physical 
constructions that are actively and historically produced, both in terms of social 
content and physical-environmental qualities. Whether we consider the making 
urban parks, urban natural reserves, the production of water supply and sanitation 
networks, irrigation landscapes, or skyscrapers, they each contain and express 
fused socio-physical and techno-natural processes that contain and embody 
particular metabolic and social relations. 
2.  There is nothing a-priory unnatural about produced environments like cities, 
genetically modified organisms, dammed rivers, or irrigated fields. Produced 
environments are specific historical results of socio-environmental processes. The 
world is a Cyborg world, part natural part social, part technical part cultural, but 
with no clear boundaries, centres, or margins. 
3.  The type and character of physical and environmental change, and the resulting 
environmental conditions, are not independent from the specific historical social, 
cultural, political, or economic conditions and the institutions that accompany 
them. It is concrete historical-geographical analysis of the production of concrete 
socio-natures that provides insights in the uneven power relations through which 
particular environments become produced and that provides pointers for the 
transformation of these power relations.  
4.  All socio-spatial processes are invariably also predicated upon the circulation and 
metabolism of physical, chemical, or biological components. Non-human ￿actants￿ 
play an active role in mobilizing socio-natural circulatory and metabolic processes 
(Latour 1999). It is these circulatory conduits that link often-distant places and 
ecosystems together and permits relating local processes with wider socio-
metabolic flows, networks, configurations, and dynamics. 
5.  Socio-environmental metabolisms produce a series of both enabling and disabling 
socio-environmental conditions. These produced milieus often embody 
contradictory tendencies. While environmental (both social and physical) qualities 
may be enhanced in some places and for some humans and non-humans, they 
often lead to a deterioration of social, physical, and/or ecological conditions and 
qualities elsewhere.  
6. Processes of metabolic change are, therefore, never socially or ecologically   14
neutral. This results in conditions under which particular trajectories of socio-
environmental change undermine the stability or coherence of some social groups, 
places or ecologies, while their sustainability elsewhere might be enhanced. In 
sum, a political-ecological examination reveals the inherently contradictory nature 
of the process of metabolic circulatory change and teases out the inevitable 
conflicts (or the displacements there-off) that infuse socio-environmental change.  
7.  Social power relations (whether material or discursive, economic, political, and/or 
cultural) through whom metabolic circulatory processes take place are particularly 
important. It is these power geometries, the human and non-human actors, and the 
socio-natural networks carrying them that ultimately decide who will have access 
to or control over, and who will be excluded from access to or control over, 
resources or other components of the environment and who or what will be 
positively or negatively enrolled in such metabolic imbroglios. These power 
geometries, in turn, shape the particular social and political configurations and the 
environments in which we live.  
8. Questions of socio-environmental sustainability are fundamentally political 
questions. Political-ecology attempts to tease out who (or what) gains from and 
who pays for, who (or what) benefits from and who suffers (and in what ways) 
from particular processes of metabolic circulatory change. It also seeks answers to 
questions about what or who needs to be sustained and how this can be maintained 
or achieved.  
9.   It is important to unravel the nature of the social relationships that unfold between 
individuals and social groups and how these, in turn, are mediated by and 
structured through processes of ecological change. In other words, environmental 
transformation is not independent from class, gender, ethnic, or other power 
struggles. Socio-ecological ￿sustainability￿ can only be achieved, therefore, by 
means of a democratically controlled and organised process of socio-
environmental (re)-construction. The political program, then, of political-ecology 
is to enhance the democratic content of socio-environmental construction by 
means of identifying the strategies through which a more equitable distribution of 
social power and a more inclusive mode of the production of nature can be 
achieved. 
   15
3. Water and Social Power: A review 
 
It is plainly extraordinary ￿ and something requiring explanation as well ￿ 
that in the proliferating and abundant literature on water problems and the ￿water 
crisis￿ relatively little if any attention is paid to one of the most trivial of truths, i.e. 
that water flows to power. Only in the most exceptional of circumstances, caused by 
unexpected events, do powerful social groups of individuals lack access to water. It is 
of course equally undisputed that ownership of, or control over water and its 
distribution and allocation are formidable sources of social power. Karl Marx already 
recognised in Capital that the owner of a waterfall possessed a ￿free gift of nature￿ 
that would improve his or her position in the competitive game. Social groups with 
sufficient social, political, economic, or cultural power do not die of thirst or see their 
crops go without water. In many instances, controlling water generates considerable 
social power, while the latter permits re-enforcing or extending this control. In other 
words, social power and the control of nature are mutually constitutive. 
In this section, we shall explore how the relationship between water and social 
power has been theorised and the insights that can be derived from it. Indeed, the 
analysis of the relationship between water and social power has a long, rich, and 
variegated history. Of course, the vital question of course is to examine the various 
ways in which the socio-hydrological cycle constitutes a flow not only of H2O, but 
also one that is saturated with all manner of power relations. We have to examine the 
various forms of power that become etched within the hydrosocial circuitry and how 
these, in turn, solidify uneven social power relations including mechanism of access 
to and exclusion from access to water. While it is evidently the case that water is 
transported trough technical infrastructures like networks of pipes, pumping stations, 
purification plants, dams, irrigation channels and the like, supported by all manner of 
engineering and technological know-how, and financed by often sophisticated 
financial instruments, this eminently socio-technical edifice that constitutes the 
terrestrial part of the socio-hydrological system expresses the various and multiple 
social power relations through which technology, knowledges, and capital become 
fused together. It is to the analysis of these power relations and how they have been 
understood over the past century that our attention will now turn. 
 
The first theoretically sophisticated analysis of the relationship between social 
power and water is Karl Wittfogel￿s thesis on political power hierarchies in Hydraulic 
Societies, a thesis fully developed in his seminal book ￿Oriental Despotism￿ 
(Wittfogel 1957). Skilfully combining an analysis of conditions of aridity with its 
irregular distribution (in time and over space) of water, of the required socio-technical 
structures of irrigation if development is to be sustained, and of political power, his 
analysis has become a canonical entry point into excavating the relationships between 
social power and water. He argued that, in ancient empires like those of China or 
Egypt, sophisticated irrigation based societies developed that exhibit an extraordinary 
degree of stability, a strict hierarchical social and political organisation characterised 
by a despotically ruling divine ￿emperor￿, surrounded by an elite stratum of 
bureaucrats and scientists, a military arm to maintain (or expand) territorial integrity, 
a small army of tax collectors, and a peasant population whose socio-ecological 
sustainability is dependent on an intricate, detailed, and sophisticated irrigation 
engineering and regulated water distribution system that demands some form of 
centralised control and organisation. It is exactly the required socio-ecological 
transformation of arid environments by means of water engineering that produced   16
such hierarchically organised, ￿despotic￿, form of society and government. Although 
very sophisticated in his analysis, and recognizing that not all societies living under 
arid or semi-arid conditions necessarily develop despotic forms of social organisation 
with an all-powerful political elite and a disempowered and politically excluded 
peasantry (which nevertheless depended on the hydraulic management and 
engineering of the elites for its sustainability), Wittfogel￿s analysis was very much 
received as one that assumed a necessary link between water management and 
authoritarian political regimes. And of course the despotic forms of water engineering 
and control characterising not only ancient political regimes, but also ￿modern￿ ones, 
like the USSR and China, seemed not only to fit Wittfogel￿s argument, but they were 
also successfully discursively mobilised in the cold-war rhetoric of post-war geo-
politics. Wittfogel￿s analysis has become seminal in analysing the relationships 
between irrigation water, other large-scale hydraulic infrastructures, and uneven 
social power relations (see (Donahue and Johnston 1998)).  
However, when during the 20
th century and, in particular, during the inter-war 
period, many developed and developing countries began to embark on national 
trajectories of large-scale modern ￿hydro-structural￿ (Arrojo Agudo 2000) 
development articulated around large dams, gigantic river re-engineering schemes, 
major water transfer projects, and large scale land reclamation and irrigation 
engineering schemes, the spectre of Wittfogel￿s analysis was also mobilised to 
theorise and understand hydro-social power relationships under modern capitalist 
forms of development. For example, Donald Worster in Rivers of Empire takes an 
explicitly Wittfogelian perspective to theorise the ￿conquest of the West￿ in the USA 
(Worster 1985). The US Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation became, 
according to Worster, these powerful elite and ￿despotic￿ bureaucratic institutions that 
combined political and technological power to push through and implement a 
particular hydro-social project and associated development model: 
 
￿The American West can best be described as a modern hydraulic society, 
which is to say, a social order based on the intensive, large-scale manipulation 
of water and its products in an arid setting. ￿ The hydraulic society of the 
West is ￿ increasingly a coercive, monolithic, and hierarchical system, ruled 
by a power elite based on the ownership of capital and expertise￿ (Worster 
1985: 7). 
 
He showed how mobilising the flows of water was predicated upon acquiring political 
and economic power, while, once control over water established, these institutions 
further consolidated and re-enforced their political and socio-economic power basis. 
Simultaneously, alternative visions or projects became marginalised and sidelined. 
These Hydraulic Modernisation dreams re-organised access to water, re-configured 
structures of entitlement and distribution and re-choreographed relative social power 
positions in and through the re-engineering of the water flows. Of course, many 
conflicts erupted in and through the implementation of these projects, expressing the 
power configurations associated with such state-based hydro-structuralism.  
 
In a similar way, the transformation of the Californian waterscape or the 
political-economic power struggles and conflicts associated with bringing sufficient 
volumes of water to Los Angeles to permit its continuous growth and expansion have 
been analysed from such vantage point. They became canonical examples of how 
control or ownership of water, the mobilisation of water￿s flows, political and   17
economic power comes together and produce simultaneously unequal power relations 
between different social groups. The interests of land speculators, urban developers, 
land managers and water bureaucrats fused together throughout Los Angeles￿s 20
th 
century history (immortalised, for example, in Roman Polanski￿s movie Chinatown), 
consolidating or re-enforcing their economic and or political power through 
mobilising, controlling and engineering ever larger watersheds, and, in the process, of 
course, water access, water rights, and water control were re-assigned and re-
distributed (see, for example, (Davis 1990); (Gottlieb 1988); (Gottlieb and 
Fitzsimmons 1991); (Hundley 1992); (Nadeau 1997); (Reisner 1990)). Neither Los 
Angeles￿s fast urbanisation nor California￿s spectacular hydro-agricultural 
development (see Walker, 2005) could have developed without changing water 
distribution, water access and, of course, socio-ecological power relations. Older 
existing water rights were questioned, groups with weaker political and economic 
power sidetracked or marginalised, and water moved around on a large scale. The 
intricate relationship between water, power, and the social order that had originally 
been identified in ￿oriental￿ societies found a fertile terrain in understanding the power 
dynamics that govern hydro-development in the ￿West￿. As Joaquin Costa, a Spanish 
intellectual already remarked at the beginning of the 20
th century, ￿to irrigate is to 
govern￿. 
 
These and many other examples illustrate that water and social power are indeed 
closely intertwined. Although I do not suggest that developments in the developed 
and the developing world follow the same pattern (see below), their hydrosocial 
configurations are centrally constructed through political and social power and 
conflict, configurations that produce simultaneously regimes of access and of 
exclusion, and produce the registers and frames for water entitlements. They suggest 
that engineering practices, technological system, and political regimes are not socially 
neutral. They embody particular social and economic visions, are associated with 
social elite formation, and are vitally important arenas for gaining or maintaining 
social power. In contrast to Wittfogels￿s central thesis, it has now been commonly 
accepted that there is no necessary link between aridity or relative scarcity of water 
and authoritarian political and economic power relations. However, a variety of social 
power relations do operate around the power/water nexus. It is commonly accepted, 
for example, that complex hydro-engineering systems that required a detailed 
technical an social division of labour and sophisticated management structures at the 
level of entire river basins or watersheds are accompanied by large, hierarchically 
organised, bureaucratic organisations, whose top cadres have considerable political, 
social, and cultural, power, and who are usually well networked with other centres of 
private and or state power. This perspective will permit addressing two interrelated 
issues. First, we shall consider the relationship between the state, the configuration of 
the state, and hydro-social development. Second, we shall analyse the relationship 
between water, money, and ownership, i.e. the central nexus around which water is 
articulated in the contemporary development process. 
 
3.1.  Water and the State: The Case of Spain 
 
The relationship between the state on the one hand and water access and water 
rights on the other is much broader than the question about ownership, public policy 
or management. As the above already suggested, there has been historically a close 
connection between the nature of the state and the dynamics of the hydraulic regime.   18
Yet, the relationship between state development models on the one hand and the 
mobilisation of water resources has been systematically neglected in considering the 
modalities of water access or water distribution. This section will exemplify how 
development models, state policies, and social power relations become reflected in 
and organised through the water resource allocation and distribution system. This, in 
turn, will permit to frame the relationship between state model, water access, and 
social power. A case study example of Spain will illustrate the changing hydraulic 
models developmental states have pursued and their effects on the geometry of social 
power relations. 
From the turn of the 20
th century onwards, economic development became 
increasingly articulated through the state and state institutions. In many countries, a 
close correspondence developed between national state elites and national economic 
elites who identified their interest with national interests, leading to the development 
of hegemonic national-hydraulic development models; models that were replicated in 
many of the world￿s regions (McCully 1996; Ward 1997). Indeed, the mobilisation of 
natural resources in a particular developmentalist fashion became an integral 
component of this modernising developmental logic (Bakker 2003). To the extent that 
water was identified as a potentially major resource for irrigation or energy purposes, 
a powerful political-economic elite emerged around its mobilisation and 
transformation. In the process, particular power geometries developed and became 
consolidated, relations that produced, simultaneously, an interconnected group of 
elites and a series of mechanisms of water exclusion and water stratification. In fact, 
as stated above, the elites never go without water, while water becomes also a 
potential basis for elite formation (Cans 1994; Kaika 2005). Invariably, the 
hierarchical bureaucratic state organisations through which this hydro-technical 
edifice became constructed and maintained shaped and produced also a stratification 
of access to and exclusion from water.   
While many examples from around the world (India, Russia, China, Brazil, South 
Africa) could be cited, a classic example of this is Spain￿s hydro-structural 
modernisation during the 20
th century and the particular power geometries that 
accompanied this process. I shall take this case as an exemplary case of the 
development of a particular articulation between state power, social power, and water 
engineering. The production of the modern Spanish waterscape started at the turn of 
the 20
th century when a distinct discourse and rhetoric of modernization emerged.  
This modernization drive, which permeated through the whole of Spanish society, 
would generate the anchoring framework for key social, political, cultural and 
technical debates and practices until the present day.  The modernizing desires of 
broad strata of Spanish society attempted to construct hegemonic, and apparently 
socially and politically progressive, visions through the social production of nature.  
Indeed, the history of Spain’s modernization has been a history of altering, redefining, 
and transforming the very physical characteristics of its waterscape, a process that 
accelerated from the late nineteenth century onwards. At that time, Spain ￿ belatedly, 
somewhat reluctantly, and almost desperately ￿ launched itself on a path of 
accelerating modernization.  Today, the country has almost 1200 dams, more than 800 
of which have been constructed during the 20
th century (see Figure 1).  Not a single 
river basin has not been altered, managed, engineered, and transformed (del Moral 
Ituarte 1998). Throughout the 20
th century, water politics and water-related social 
struggle and conflict have characterised the progressive modernization of the country. 
Water policy continues to be one of the most controversial and contested terrain in 
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From the turn of the 20
th century onwards, water rapidly became a prime 
consideration in national political, socio-economic and cultural debates. Whilst other 
European imperialist countries were consolidating their geographical imperial 
expansion overseas at the end of the nineteenth century, the traditional Spanish elites 
found themselves in a highly traumatic condition with the loss in 1898 of their last 
colonial possessions, Cuba, Puerto Rica, and the Philippines, after a disastrous ￿War 
of independence￿ (Carr 1995) (Figuero and Santa Cecilia 1998).  Faced with a 
mounting economic crisis, growing social tensions, a rising bourgeoisie in the North, 
and an antiquated and still largely feudal social order in the South that was lamenting 
the imperial defeat, Spanish emerging progressive cultural, professional, political, and 
intellectual elites were desperately searching for a way to revive or to ￿regenerate￿ the 
nation’s social and economic base.  This drive to revive the nation’s ￿spirit￿ became 
known as ￿el regeneracionismo￿ (Fusi and Palafox 1989). Emerging from growing 
discontent from the 1870s onwards, regeneracionism became associated with a 
movement, the ￿Generation of ￿98￿, a loose group of intellectuals and modernizing 
elites that were particularly concerned with reviving and modernising Spain in the 
context of the twin drama of internal disintegration and the loss of external imperial 
power. 
In the absence of an external geographical project as the foundation to 
modernization, the Spanish modernizing elites concentrated on a national program 
that would be equally geographical but founded on the radical transformation of 
Spain’s water resources (G￿mez Mendoza and Ortega Cantero 1987). This national 
geographical project would revolve around the hydrological/agricultural nexus. 
Spain’s ￿perturbed hydraulic imbalance￿ became the axis around which both the 
socio-cultural and economic malaise was explained, and where the course of action 
resided.  It permitted progressive elites to raise social problems (class struggle, 
economic decline, mass unemployment) as important issues without formulating them 
in class terms. This, in turn, enabled the formation of an initially weak, but gradually 
growing, coalition of reformist socialists, populists, industrialists, and enlightened 
agricultural elites into a hegemonic block with a modernist vision of Spain’s future - 
an alliance aimed to defeat the traditionalists and keep revolutionary socialists and 
anarchists at bay.  Although coalitions, objectives, and means would change over 
time, the hydrosocial basis for modernization would remain the guiding principle for 
this hegemonic vision that would become the pivot of Spain’s development until the 
end of the fascist Franco regime (Swyngedouw 1999). 
          This project to remake Spanish geography as a part of modernization combined 
a decidedly political strategy, a particular ideological vision, a call for a scientific-
positivist understanding of the natural world, a scientific-technocratic engineering 
mission, and a popular base rooted in a traditional peasant rural culture.  Plenty of 
evidence can be found for this in the work of Joaquin Costa and in that of his 
contemporaries (for a review, see (Ort￿ 1984)).  The revolution in the state - but 
certainly not of the state - effected through a politics of spatial and environmental 
transformation, would centre around the defence of the small peasant producer-cum-
landowner, state control and ownership of water, educational enhancement, technical-
scientific control, and the leap to power of an alliance of small-holders and the new 
bourgeoisie that hitherto had been largely marginalized by the aristocratic land-
owning elite and their associated administrators in the state apparatus. At the same 
time, the focus on restoring or, in fact, expanding land-ownership through "internal 
colonization," fostered growth in and concentrated the efforts of an "organically" 
organized state that brought together reformist intellectuals, some worker movements,   21
and the nascent industrial bourgeoisie in a more or less coherent vision of reform 
against the traditionalists (Ortega 1975). The sublimation of the many tensions and 
conflicts within this loose alliance of reformists, when accomplished through a focus 
on re-organizing Spain’s hydraulic geography, served the twin purpose of providing a 
discursive vehicle to ally hitherto excluded social groups without defining the 
problem purely in class or other conflictual social terms. This organic and anti-
revolutionary (in social class terms) reformism in which the state would take centre 
stage to organize the socio-spatial transformation would, after the failed attempts to 
initiate reform during the first few decades of the twentieth century, provide a 
substratum on which the later falangist, organicist and fascist ideology would thrive.  
          In sum, the regeneracionist agenda(s) firstly maintained that the restoration of 
wealth in Spain should be based on the knowledge of the laws and balances of nature; 
secondly, this restoration required the correction of defects imposed by the geography 
of the country and particularly its ￿imbalances in its climatic and hydraulic regimes￿ 
(G￿mez Mendoza and Ortega Cantero 1992); and, thirdly, this enterprise of 
geographical rectification could, because of its range and importance, only be carried 
out by the central public authorities The hydraulic mission was seen as the solution to 
the social problems facing Spain at the turn of the century.  Failing this, social 
tensions were bound to intensify and struggle, if not civil war, would be the likely 
outcome.  Ironically, of course, the voluntarist, powerful, and autocratic hydraulic 
engineer pursuing a program of imposed reform foreshadowed the fascist (falangist) 
ideology. The latter would gain momentum from the early nineteen twenties onwards, 
first with the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and, later with Franco. The failure of the 
hydraulic politics in the early decades of the twentieth century announced what the 
￿progressive￿ elites had feared and desperately tried to prevent. Although the debates 
at the turn of the century indicated a desire to regenerate Spain, conservative forces 
prevented its actual implementation and social tension intensified, further 
destabilizing an already highly fragmented and divisive society.  
The centralizing fascist regime that emerged from this turmoil after the civil 
war of 1936-1939 could finally push through the production of a new hydraulic 
geography, a new nature and a new waterscape, something the regeneracionists of the 
turn of the century had so desperately advocated, but failed to accomplish. As Figure 
1 shows, the great expansion of dams and reservoirs, both in number and capacity, 
took off particularly during the second half of General Franco￿s rule (see 
(Swyngedouw 2006)). Over the 35 years of his rule, the number of dams grew from 
about 180 in 1939 to over 800, the reservoir capacity expanded exponentially. In 
addition, by the time he died, the backbone for a nationally integrated system for 
inter-river basin transfers, that would permit considering the hydrosocial cycle as an 
integral and unitary national cycle (HernÆndez, 1994: 15), was under construction (the 
1,000 Hm3 Tajo-Segura water transfer).  
There are clearly two phases in the making of the fascist hydro-social 
landscape. The first period, between 1939 and 1955, characterised by a sustained 
rhetoric of the urgent need for expanding irrigation through the construction of state 
led grand hydraulic works but with few real achievements. While 106 new dams were 
built between 1941 and 1955, the capacity of reservoir water only rose from about 
4,000 hm3 to 8,000 hm3. The acceleration of the remaking of Spain￿s hydro-social 
network would have to wait until a repositioning of the geo-political relations and 
their associated political economic networking and flows of capital, expertise, and 
steel would take a radical turn after 1953. As geo-political alliances with the US were 
restored and investment and aid capital began to flow back into Spain, the ambitious   22
hydraulic vision could be finally realised. This moment would indeed prove to be a 
￿watershed￿ in terms of permitting the realisation of Franco￿s hydro-vision for Spain. 
After the mid fifties, there seemed no limit on the ￿progress￿ made to produce a 
radically different Spanish waterscape, one that would find its ultimate realisation in 
the construction of the first large inter-river basin transfer scheme. Between 1955 and 
1970, 276 dams were built with reservoir capacity skyrocketing to 37,000 hm
3 by 
1970 and to 42,000 by 1980. Mega-dams built during this period massively increased 
the regulatory, hydro-electrical and irrigation capacity of Spain. In his speech to 
commemorate the 20
th anniversary of ￿Our Movement￿ and ￿The Victory￿, Franco 
himself insisted how his ￿great hydraulic and irrigation works are changing the 
geography of Spain￿. The backbone of the national system would be the first large 
inter river basin water transfer scheme, the Tajo-Segura project. It does not come as a 
surprise, then, that towards the end of Franco￿s life, he was seen as the great master 
dam builder. The Chairman of the Spanish and International Commission on Large 
Dams saluted Franco, in 1971, in a speech presented to him, as ￿the great builder of 
great dams and an example, unique in the world, of a statesman who creates the 
hydraulic foundations for the progress of his people￿ (TorÆn 1971). Franco had indeed 
directed and overseen the complete socio-hydraulic revolution of Spain. Of course, 
this achievement depended crucially on the loyal support of a series of powerful 
interlocked national and international ￿networks of interests￿ and coalitions 
(Melgarejo Moreno 1995) (Swyngedouw 2006). They often overlapped partially, 
were occasionally antagonistic, and required careful massaging and ￿managing￿ 
within an overall ￿Falangist￿ programme and ideology. 
The revolutionary geographical re-ordering of Spain, articulated through the 
remaking of its hydraulic technonatural configuration, mobilised discursive, symbolic, 
and material processes and enrolled H20 in a specific manner. This assemblage was 
made possible and held together by the re-making of national and international scalar 
networks of power. These networks effectively marginalised or repressed those who 
dissented. During Franco￿s regime, any kind of opposition, even of the mildest kind, 
resulted invariably in serious bodily consequences (imprisonment, exile, forced 
labour, torture, even execution). Franco￿s project literally produced a unitary national 
territorial complex, a feat predicated upon eliminating dissenting political voices, 
regionalist impulses and alternative configurations. While the final quarter of the 20
th 
century showed a perplexing reshuffling of the social and political relations of and in 
Spain, the Franco legacy of course proved resilient to change as vested interests and 
existing power geometries tried to hold on to their powers. The Hydraulic engineers 
and bureaucracy, and the agricultural and Southern elites wished to perfect the system 
initiated by Franco, but, of course, the actors around the hydrosocial nexus began to 
multiply as democracy took root after 1978. The voices of regionalists, the actions of 
environmentalists, the financial might and regulatory order of the European Union are 
increasingly entangled with newly enrolled actants such as birds, wetlands, sediments, 
and local cultural rights, demanding new and different forms of water organisation 
and forcing new networked arrangements, around which radically different socio-
environmental and technonatural projects crystallise (see, for example, (Fundaci￿n-
Nueva-Cultura-del-Agua 2005)).     
 In Franco￿s hydrosocial vision, the political and the technical, the social and the 
natural, become mobilised through and etched in spatial arrangements that shape 
shape distinct social and technonatural landscapes (that produce many of the 
strawberries, tomatoes or salads consumed in the rest of Europe or the landscapes of 
recreation on the Spanish costa). They are simultaneously heroic achievements   23
expressing a modernising desire, the legacy of a brutal authoritarian regime, and the 
pain and suffering of millions of unnamed workers and peasants. It is also on this 
edifice and in the interstices of their enduring power assemblages that presently a 
range of new socio-ecological movements, innovative political visions, new 
institutional arrangements, and alternative socio-technical projects are debated, 
framed, envisaged, and struggled for. More importantly, Spain￿s example illustrate 
how state power, the mobilisation of particular elite interest, and hydrosocial 
development fuse together in particular ensembles of power, predicated upon the 
control and transformation of the terrestrial hydrological configuration. 
 
While this example suggests the relation between state power, political project, 
and hydraulic interventions and transformation, a relationship that is present in most 
countries around the world, the fundamental axis around which the water nexus is 
organised   -- as exemplified above by the role of US capital flows to Spain --   
remains of course the availability of and access to capital. This is what we shall turn 
to next.  
 
 
3.2. Water, Money and the City. 
 
Ultimately of course, the power question is structured primarily through the 
money nexus. This is particularly true in urban contexts where money is the main 
intermediary in transacting and regulating the exchange of water (Goubert 1989). The 
money/water nexus will be explored using a variety of urban examples from around 
the world. ’Thirsty Cities’ are a growing problem in Third World contexts (Anton 
1993). Nevertheless, the complex web of the "Metabolism of the Cities" (Wolman, 
1965: 179) surely relies on an incessant flow of water through the veins of the city. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that intense social and political struggles around water 
characterise the world￿s urbanisation processes.  
It is, of course, fairly trivial to say that the urbanization process is predicated 
upon myriad socio-ecological transformations that affect the geographies of places 
both nearby and far away (Cronon 1991). This intense socio-environmental 
transformation is required to ￿sustain￿ the dynamics of contemporary urban change, 
resulting in the formation of various new environments ￿ from concrete urban 
landscapes to aquatic eco-systems around reservoirs. The process of urbanization is 
both a historically specific accumulation of socio-environmental processes and the 
arena through which these transformations take place. Water has always possessed 
powerful connotations and conveyed important symbolic messages. ￿Naturalness￿, 
virginity, healing and purification have often been associated with water, while water 
spectacles have in many ways testified to the power and the glory of various kinds of 
(urban) elites (Moore and Lidz 1994). For example, the cultural links between female 
nudity and the tap water of the bathroom began to be formed in the second half of the 
19th century, as the sprinkling of water from an intricately engineered network of 
pipes over the naked (female) body within the intimacy of the private bathroom 
became part of the fantasy of sexual intimacy (Illich 1986). Simultaneously, water 
became a commodity, expressing the social relationships within the space through 
which it circulated and to which it gave form and content. The biological necessity of 
water ensured that urbanisation was predicated upon organizing, controlling and 
mastering its socio-natural circulation.  For example, in Mexico City, 60 per cent of 
all urban potable water is distributed to 3 per cent of the households, whereas 50 per   24
cent make do on five percent. In Guayaquil, 65 per cent of the urban dwellers receive 
3 per cent of the produced potable water at a price that is at least two hundred times 
higher (20,000 per cent) than that paid by the low volume consumer connected to the 
piped urban water network (Swyngedouw 2004). The mechanisms of exclusion from 
and access to water manifest the power relationships through which the geography of 
cities is shaped and transformed ((Bennett 1995). 
Cities first became dependent on water flowing through aqueducts that pierced 
the city wall, or from wells penetrating the earth. Nine major aqueducts, with a total 
length of over 400 kilometres, supplied approximately 400 litres of water per capita 
per day to ancient Rome, which had a population of approximately a million by 100 
A.D. However, one fifth of this water was assigned to the emperor, whilst another 
two-fifths fed the city’s 591 fountains and dozen public baths. In contrast, in 1823, 
London, Frankfurt and Paris had 3 litres per capita per day, a figure which had only 
risen to approximately 40 litres by 1936 (Mumford 1961); a volume less than that 
found in many cities in the colonial or post-colonial world at that time.  
 
3.2.1 The invention of circulation and the power politics of the body 
 
The concept of ￿water circulation￿, with water following a given path into, 
through, and finally out of the city by the sewers remained foreign to western urban 
imaginations, spatial representations and engineering systems until the 19th century. 
Modern urbanization, highly dependent on the mastering of circulating water, is 
linked with the representation of water as a circulatory system. By the mid 19th 
century some British architects begin to speak of the inner city using the same 
metaphor of circulation, and in 1842 Sir Edwin Chadwick formulated the ideology of 
circulating waters effectively for the first time (Chadwick 1842). In his report, 
Chadwick imagined the new city as "a social body through which water must 
incessantly circulate, leaving it again as dirty sewage". Water ought to ’circulate’ 
through the city without interruption to wash it of sweat, excrement, and waste. The 
brisker this flow, the fewer stagnant pockets that breed pestilence there are and the 
healthier the city will be. The ￿bacteriological city￿ of the late 19
th century (see 
(Gandy 2004)) turned the attention of the elites to the fate of the urban poor. Turning 
the total city into a hygienic space became a necessary condition to sustain the elite￿s 
health. Unless water constantly circulates through the city, pumped in and channelled 
out, the interior space imagined by Chadwick can only stagnate and rot.  
This representation of urban space as constructed in and through perpetually 
circulating flows of water is conspicuously similar to imagining the city as a vast 
reservoir of perpetually circulating money. In fact, Chadwick’s papers were published 
under the title The Health of Nations during the centenary commemoration for Adam 
Smith (Chadwick 1887). Like the individual body and bourgeois society, the city was 
now also described as a network of pipes and conduits. The brisker the flow, the 
greater the wealth, the health and hygiene of the city would be (Vigarello 1988). Just 
as William Harvey redefined the body postulating the circulation of the blood, so 
Chadwick redefined the city by ￿discovering￿ its needs to be constantly washed. And 
of course, Baron von Haussman, the engineer who masterminded the reorganisation 
of Paris￿ cityscape also successfully mobilised the metaphor of ￿circulation￿ to 
impress and convince the city￿s leaders of the necessity of his grandiose project 
(Gandy 2004); a project that would permit all sorts of flows, form sewage to people 
and commodities, to move more swiftly through the city. Later, David Harvey would 
analyse the circulation of capital and its urbanization as a perpetuum mobile   25
channelled through a myriad of ever-changing production, communication, and 
consumption networks, driven by a motley crew of financial speculators, profit 
seeking capitalists, visionary urbanists, and enlightened elites striving to modernise 
and ￿civilise￿ urban life (Harvey 1985). 
 
The image and practice of water, now disciplined and harnessed in circulatory 
urban water systems, was profoundly transformed. Defecating became a sex-specific 
activity for the first time in history towards the middle of the 18th century, as separate 
latrines for men and women were set up ￿ but only for special occasions (Corbin 
1994). At the end of that century, Marie Antoinette had a door installed to her 
lavatory, thus turning the act of defecation into an intimate function (Illich 1986). The 
degree to which it is practiced in private also signals a certain social status and an 
embracing of superior civic morality (Vigarello 1988). On 15 November 1793, the 
French revolutionary convention solemnly declared each man’s right to his own bed, 
thus enshrining the right to be surrounded by a buffer zone protecting the citizen from 
the aura of others. The private bed, stool and grave became requisites of a citizen’s 
dignity. Children began to learn that hygiene and sanitary activities are a solemn, 
private process (Goubert 1989), again indicating a profound re-definition of the self 
and the body in the ￿utopian￿ urban space. 
The toilette of the whole city was undertaken in parallel with the privatisation 
of body relief and the attempt to retrench people’s auras, reducing each other to an 
odourless point in the new civic space. This culminated in the modern design 
principles of Le Corbusier, heralding clean air, ventilation, pure water and treated 
sewage (Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000). Water became a detergent of smell, as one 
could move up the social ladder only through eliminating body smells. It was not until 
the 19th century that soap became associated with body laundry and the social 
repression of smell became an element in the class struggle of the elite in search of 
￿cultural capital￿ to distinguish themselves from the ￿smelly￿ commoners. Shortly 
afterwards, perfume and the ￿domestication of aura￿ (Illich 1986) became employed in 
the act of seduction, no longer merely covering body smell, but artificially providing 
secondary sexual characteristics to the new ￿human￿ body. Like so many other 
characteristics -- including work, health, and education -- smell, too, is henceforth 
conceived as an abstract quality that is ￿naturally￿ polarized into a female and a male 
type: she smells of violets and roses and he of leather and tobacco. The toilette came 
to mean a tub bath, and around 1880, the industrial production of enamel paints 
replaced expensive copper with iron or zinc vessels and brought the tub within reach 
of simple families (Wright 1960). ￿Toilette￿ retired behind closed doors (together with 
perfuming, shitting, and shaving), and began to involve the flow of tap water to carry 
soapsuds and excrements to the sewer (Goubert 1989). When the first urban water 
system in Guayaquil was installed, for example, the urban elites brought finely 
decorated lavatories and washing bowls from their trips to Europe to testify to their 
newly acquired sanitised civic conditions. Lower classes and indigenous people 
visited the houses to marvel at these symbols of a new elite urban order. The total 
bathroom was not installed overnight. It is revealing that the place in which the 
modern body is integrated into the circulation of city waters is called the ￿bath￿-room. 
The choice of this term indicates that the identification of nature and the nude, which 
Ingres, Courbet, Degas, and Renoir had painted as taking place in rivers, under 
waterfalls or in an ￿oriental￿ hamam, was actually performed in the intimacy of the 
toilette (Illich 1986: 66). Public space became increasingly hydrophobic and the 
public body in the western city desperately tried to cover itself to protect it from   26
public waters and public gazes alike. Indeed, as (Vigarello 1988): 216) attests, ￿the 
exclusion of others became an obligatory element in the cleanliness of the elite￿, 
 
In sum, the increasingly commodified domestication of water announced the 
withdrawal of the urban elite body and bodily hygiene from the public or semi-public 
sphere and its retreat into the privacy and intimacy of the bathroom and the toilet. The 
hydrophobic public spaces were replaced by hydrophilic private spaces as bodily 
encounters were relegated to specially designed places. This, in turn, redefined the 
body and bodily relations. Nudity and exposing the naked body to the ￿elements￿ 
became improper and uncivilised. The new sanitised and de-odorised (washed) urban 
body in a sanitised urban public civic space redefined both class and gender relations. 
Images of (predominantly female) sexuality began to revolve around the secrets, 
intimacy and eroticism associated with the bathroom, the toilet and the sprinkling of 
domesticated water over the naked body (Corbin 1994). Of course, the newly de-
odorised urban body, embodying quite literally a new civic, modern-urban ideal, 
carried by an urban bourgeoisie that was becoming quickly self-confident of its new 
role, became re-odorised in new ways, expressing cultural distinction and power 
differentiation (Bourdieu 1986). But this new urban civic body also separated the 
sanitised bodies of the new urban elites from the peasant reeking of manure and the 
sweaty proletarian. Class and gender relations became impregnated with smell and 
odour and the body aura became an element in cultural and social differentiation and 
power relations. Domesticated and purified water was seen as ￿good￿ water, external 
and ￿public￿ water as ￿bad￿ water, but also as waters that could be used as a reservoir 
for waste (Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000).  
 
Urban waterworks signalled this new class and gender differentiation. The 
mechanisms of exclusion from and access to unlimited quantities of potable water 
were cemented into the water engineering system itself and remain like this until this 
very day. In Third World cities, for example, the colonial or early post-colonial elites, 
clustering around the water reservoirs, had and have unlimited access to water, which 
in addition to the above cultural distinctions, turned this into significantly longer life 
expectancy and into valued symbols of cultural capital and social power. In may 
developing cities today, permanently irrigated tropical gardens separate the often 
militarised urban oases in the gated communities of the elites from the urban desert 
that surrounds them, fountains in the courtyards testify to their social position. Images 
of the smelly peasant and un-hygienic indigenous population re-enforce the position 
of water as an integral element of social power in the city and part of the process of 
the urbanization of nature. Nevertheless, water-related illnesses and deaths remain the 
major cause of infant mortality for most of the world’s population. In short, the urban 
ecological conquest of water and the fusion of water circulation with the urbanization 
process, its commodified domestication and related processes of access to and 
exclusion from access brought water squarely into the realm of urban social power. 
 
3.2.2 Social power and water control 
 
The domestication of water and the privatisation of bodily hygiene were 
predicated upon and paralleled by an increasing commodification of water. The 
urbanisation of water necessitated both ecological transformation (capturing water 
from underground aquifers or distant watersheds, engineering its flow, negotiating 
geo-political relations, transforming its chemical and biological properties and so   27
forth) and social transformation. Indeed, the very homogenisation and standardisation 
of ￿potable￿ urban water propelled the diverse physical, chemical, and biological 
￿natural￿ flows and characteristics of nature’s water into the realm of commodity and 
money circulation with its abstract qualities and concrete social power relations. 
￿Potable￿ water became legally defined and standardised. Bio-chemical and physical 
treatment (adding or extracting substances) was required to homogenise water 
according to ￿scientific￿ politically and socio-culturally defined norms that were 
enshrined in binding legislation. Homogenisation, standardisation, and legal 
codification are essential to the commodification process.  
The urban conquest and commodification of water brought H2O squarely into 
the sphere of money and cultural capital and its associated power relations, and 
redrew socio-natural power relations in important new ways. The use of water 
cleansing the body and the use of water for the ￿toilette￿ of city spaces go hand-in-
hand. The urbanization of water through vast engineering systems of potable water 
production, conduction and distribution became an inherent element underpinning the 
urbanization of society in the 19th and 20th century. The modern city had become a 
rhizome of networks and conduits. 
The ’modern’ engineering systems through which water is mastered and 
becomes commodified demand large capital investments with installations that have a 
long life span (sometimes 50 to 100 years) and an immense infrastructure system that 
guides the circulation of water in an interconnected way over a large scale, often 
covering entire regions (Montano and Coing 1985). It is clear that such a system 
requires some form of central control and a co-ordinated, combined but detailed 
division of labour (see (Worster 1985)). In addition, the quantity, quality, and 
regularity of the circulating waters are determined by the weakest link in this detailed 
technical and social division of labour. Sufficiently large amounts of capital have to 
be amassed and sunk into the construction of s fixed infrastructure systems with long 
turnover times and relatively low returns. Circulating capital had to be captured and 
organised in fixed physical infrastructures that would permit the ￿free￿ circulation of 
clean water (as well as of the waste waters). The early private capital based urban 
￿watering￿ initiatives were gradually replaced by primarily state-funded investments 
in public water works, managed by large public or mixed public-private companies 
(Lorrain 1995)(see below). 
In addition, the processes of water production, conduction, and distribution are 
necessarily spatially structured, shaping and being shaped by urban and regional 
physical and social geographies. Producing and providing water is essentially and 
necessarily a deeply localized activity, while transporting bulk water is a difficult  -- 
and costly -- process. This double tendency of modern water systems towards 
centralization and central control on the one hand and the necessarily localized 
character of all parts of its circulation process on the other, works itself out in very 
contradictory and conflicting ways as will be documented in our case-study of 
Guayaquil below. Although geo-climatic conditions such as the availability and type 
of natural water resources and pluvial regimes, as well as settlement patterns, are of a 
great importance for the organization of water management systems, these physical 
characteristics cannot be separated from the organization of human relations. Indeed, 
the relative scarcity of usable water will only influence the mode of water 
management to the extent that social groups will enter into competition for its 
utilisation and that relations of co-operation and relations of power will translate 
themselves into specific institutional, managerial and technological systems (Anton 
1993). (Montano and Coing 1985) summarize this succinctly:   28
 
￿The management of water is, therefore, always the result of the social 
relationships which crystallise around its appropriation and its usage. It varies 
in function of both the geo-climatic constraints and the relationships of power 
between users￿. 
 
The social struggle around water is evidently the result of the deeply exclusive 
and marginalizing political, economic, and ecological processes that drove the 
expansion of the city. The urbanization process is predicated upon the mastering and 
engineering of nature’s water, with the ecological conquest of water as a necessary 
pre-requisite for the expansion and growth of the city. At the same time, the capital 
required to build and expand the urban landscape is also generated through the 
political-ecological transformation of the city’s hinterland. Indeed, the capital required 
to build water systems, particularly in the developing world, has to be generated by 
means of producing exportable goods in exchange for hard currency. The city’s 
growth, and the process of water urbanization are closely associated with successive 
waves of ecological conquest and the extension of the urban socio-ecological frontier. 
Local, regional, and national socio-natures are combined with engineering narratives, 
economic discourses and practices, land speculation, the geo-politics of water, and 
global money flows. Investments in bottled water companies, speculation in water-
industry related financial instruments and global/local hydrological cycles fuse 
together in the production of hybridised waters and cyborg cities. Water circulation 
and the urbanisation of water thus become deeply entrenched in the political-ecology 
of the local and national state, the international divisions of labour and power, and the 
local regional and global hydrological climatic cycles. 
 
In short, the urbanisation of water and the social, economic, and cultural 
processes associated with the domestication of water brought access to nature’s water 
squarely into the realm of class, gender, and cultural differentiation and made water 
subject to an intense struggle for control and/or access. The commodification of 
water, in turn, placed the circulation of water directly in the sphere of money 
circulation, which consequently made access to water dependent on positions of social 
power, both economically and in terms of gender and culture. Although the particular 
geographical and institutional configurations vary significantly from city to city and 
from country to country depending on the particular combination of physical and 
institutional factors, the 20th century urbanization process and the accompanying 
expansion of water use significantly affected the spatial choreography of urban water 
circulation (Graham and Marvin 2001). For each expanding city, the physical-
territorial basis on which the successful watering of the city rests needs to expand as 
the city grows, in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms. Either new untapped 
water reserves have to be incorporated in the urban water cycle or existing water 
supplies tapped more intensely. In the case of aquifer water, this leads either to a 
problem of generalized over-pumping which outstrips the natural recharge capacities 
of aquifers or to a gradually decline in the quality of aquifer waters (as, for example, 
in the case of Mexico city (see (Castro 2006)). The geographical expansion of the 
ecological footprint of urban water not only transforms places and environments far 
removed from the city, but also intensifies conflicts with other users over limited 
water supplies. From the vantage point of the early 21st century, there is increasing 
evidence that the sustainability of urban development was bought at the expense of an 
expanding water frontier and of geographically widening the sphere of impact of the   29
urban water cycle, leading to socially conflicting and socio-ecologically unsustainable 
practices of expanding resource extraction and intensified struggle for control or 
access.  
 
3.2.3 An example: Guayaquil, Ecuador 
 
In what follows, we seek to document and analyse the historical geography of 
water control in the context of Guayaquil’s urbanization process in order to unravel 
the relations of power that are inscribed in the way the urbanization of water/nature 
unfolded. We shall indicate how the urbanization of water and the capital required to 
build and expand the urban landscape itself are dependent on the political and 
ecological transformation of both city and countryside. In short, the political and 
ecological history of Guayaquil’s urbanization process will be written from the 
perspective of the need to urbanize and domesticate nature’s water and the parallel 
necessity to push the ecological frontier outward as the city expanded. We shall 
further explore how the circulation of water is embedded in social power relations that 
operate through and are expressed in the combination of political and ecological 
processes. Indeed, we maintain throughout the story that the political/social/economic 
cannot be separated from the ecological in understanding the urbanization process. 
Particularly in cities that have a problematic water supply condition, mechanisms of 
exclusion from and access to water lay bare how the transformation of nature through 
urbanization is infused with relations of power.  
Guayaquil, Ecuador￿s largest and most powerful city located on the Pacific 
coast, suffers from a seriously socially uneven access to potable urban water, like 
many other cities in developing countries. 38% of its two million inhabitants do not 
have access to piped potable water, and depend on private vendors who sell water at a 
massively inflated price. Publicly supplied water costs approximately three cents for 
1000 litres, while private water vendors charge three dollars. As a result, an intense 
social and political struggle, enacted at bodily, neighbourhood, urban, regional, 
national, and international scales, unfolds over access to and control over the city￿s 
water resources. The uneven power relationships that have shaped Guayaquil￿s 
urbanisation process are thus etched into the circulation of urban H2O (see 
(Swyngedouw 2004) (Figure 2). 
Clearly, the urbanization process itself is predicated upon the mastering and 
engineering of nature’s water. The ecological conquest of water is, therefore, an 
integral part of the expansion and growth of the city. At the same time, the capital 
required to build and expand the urban water landscape itself is, at least in the case of 
Guayaquil, generated through the political-ecological transformation of the city’s 
hinterland and the successive incorporation of both expanding water volumes as well 
as new forms of socio-ecological metabolism. The city￿s growth has required a 
progressive geographical expansion of its water footprint. As more migrants flocked 
to the city, water systems had to move further away from the city in search of new or 
additional water resources. Simultaneously, the financing of these capital-intensive 
projects, whose technology was invariably imported from abroad, necessitated the 
generation of sufficient foreign currency and, consequently, a sound export-based 
economy. These capital flows were generated initially on the basis of cocoa (circa 
1890 ￿ 1930), followed by bananas (circa 1950-1970) and oil (after 1972). When the 
urban water condition reached catastrophic conditions in the early 1990s, globalised 
privatisation became the new strategy. With each successive phase, the configurations 
of power at the local, regional, national, and international level became transformed   30
and re-articulated. In what follows, we shall explore the historical dynamics of the 











































Figure 2. Distribution of Households that have no direct access to the water 
network (percentages), Guayaquil, Ecuador, 1990.    31
         At the turn of the 20
th century, the city￿s political-economic elites mobilised 
around a growing pre-occupation with the presence and role of water in the city. This 
paralleled a changing socio-spatial class position and a reconfiguration of the state 
apparatus. After independence (1830) and particularly after 1850, the early post-
colonial society underwent significant socio-spatial changes as Ecuador was gradually 
transformed into an agro-export economy. This Ecuadorian development model 
originated with the expansion of world demand for and trade in cocoa around 1860. 
Cocoa accounted for 90% of total exports by 1890, and in 1904 Ecuador became the 
world￿s leading cocoa exporter (Aguirre 1984) (Chiriboga 1988). The coastal socio-
ecological complex, originally mainly characterised by small scaled and a largely self-
contained peasantry, had given way to immense cocoa plantations involving a variety 
of forms of waged work. The forced and rapid formation of a wage-dependent class, 
combined with a fast de-peasantisation process, fed growing demands not only for 
wage labour in the coastal plantations, but also for auxiliary waged functions in the 
city. Between 1896 and 1920, Guayaquil grew from 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants 
(Rojas and Villavicencio 1988).  
The rise of the emergent Guayaquileæo metropolis was predicated on the 
transformation of nature and the integration of a new cocoa-based agricultural 
ecology in the process of commodity production and rent extraction. Countryside and 
city were both restructured through this socio-ecological conquest, which inserted the 
central coastal region of Ecuador squarely into a worldwide money-circulation 
process and produced the city as the nexus for rent appropriation and distribution. At 
the same time, the spatial scaling of political power was also redrawn. Through these 
political-economic and ecological shifts, the urban merchant bourgeoisie, in alliance 
with coastal landowners and cocoa producers, now controlled the city and the 
countryside and began to aspire for more national political influence. The coastal 
political elite increasingly challenged the hegemony of the traditional highland 
(Serrano) landed ￿aristocracy￿ (Guerrero 1980). Eventually, the coastal ￿cocoa￿ elite 
managed to ￿jump scale￿ and displace the highland aristocracy from the helm of the 
national state apparatus.  
In 1900, Eloy Alfaro, liberal Guyaquileæo politician and president of Ecuador, 
declared the urban water project and other sanitary infrastructure a work of national 
importance, to be financed largely by the national state on the basis of taxes levied on 
cocoa exports. Between that moment and the 1930s, the urban water system was 
gradually extended, following, but lagging behind, the pace of urbanization. It became 
evident that the water frontier needed to be pushed outward in search of new 
exploitable water reserves, in order to redress the imbalance. The growth and 
expansion of the city could only be sustained by incorporating ever-larger parts of 
nature’s geography into the circulation of money and profit upon which the city’s 
continuing prominence crucially depended. This incorporation of new ￿natural￿ waters 
into the urban water circulation process then enabled the extension of the material 
scale of the urban network. By the early 1930s, Guayaquil had a fully operational 
water system, with almost full coverage and connections, and 24-hour supply, a great 
success at the time and one the city would never be able to repeat again. 
This successful watering of the city was very short lived however. The 
urbanisation of water slowed down dramatically as political power relationships 
began to shift in decisive new ways, particularly after the crumbling of the cocoa 
economy. By the end of the 1930s, the highly successful and hegemonic bourgeois 
growth coalition that had launched Guayaquil on a path of dependent modernisation 
had fallen apart. The collapse of the cocoa economy produced the first cracks in the   32
hitherto firmly allied coastal-regional elite alliance of cocoa producers, merchants and 
financiers. The socio-ecological opening up of Africa for world cocoa production, 
phyto-sanitary problems resulting from monoculture practices, and a dwindling 
demand for cocoa from Europe during the First World War negatively affected prices, 
productivity, and production. Cocoa revenues fell by 21% between 1917 and 1926, 
and cocoa output fell by 45%. The urbanisation of water stuttered during this period. 
Changing socio-ecological processes in the urban region were thus, in a myriad of 
intricate ways, related to and expressive of fluctuations on the world￿s commodities 
exchange markets and the vagaries of the international monetary system. The 
disintegration of the cocoa economy threw many agricultural semi-proletarian 
workers into unemployment and poverty, fuelling a mass migration to the city. The 
city experienced rapid population growth (182% between 1925 and 1950), mainly 
through urban land-invasions and the construction of informal settlements by 
impoverished former cocoa workers. 
While the urban population expanded, the urbanisation of capital dried up, 
including investments in collective infrastructure. The resulting slowdown in the 
urbanisation of water in the context of an expanding population led to an acute water 
crisis by the end of the forties. Water problems would never really go away again. On 
the contrary, exclusionary water politics and water speculation by vendors would 
increasingly characterise urban struggles, becoming integral to the rituals of everyday 
urban life. The turbulent but lean years of the 1940s were followed, however, by the 
banana bonanza decade of the 1950s. The United States’ fruit corporations, their 
plantations devastated by Panama disease, moved their centre of operations from 
Central American and Caribbean exporters to Ecuador. It was a cheap location, and 
the Panama disease had not moved that far south. The subsequent spiralling demand 
for bananas converted the coastal area of the country (La Costa) into large banana 
plantations with their associated socio-ecological relations. Banana export receipts 
exploded from US$2.8 million in 1948 to $88.9 million in 1960, accounting for 
62.2% of Ecuador’s total exports (Grijalva 1990; Hurtado 1985). This ￿banana-
bonanza￿ was organised through a new political-economic and ecological 
transformation. The ecological frontier for agricultural export production around 
Guayaquil was pushed further inland, radically altering the scalar social and physical 
ecology of the urban-rural complex and incorporating ever-larger areas into the global 
circulation of money. Although smallholdings predominantly organised actual 
production, its commercialisation was concentrated in very few hands, combining a 
tiny regional-national comprador elite with U.S. global fruit-trading companies (BÆez 
1985). This banana colonisation prompted mass migration to the coastal areas, 
catalysing further rapid growth of Guayaquil, whose banana-dependent financial and 
service economy expanded rapidly (Carri￿n 1992). Between 1950 and 1974, the city￿s 
population grew from 200,000 to over 820,000. 
In 1947, a new source for drinking water for Guayaquil surfaced as the next 
target to harness, the river Daule, but it would take until the 1950s banana boom 
before these plans could be realised. Together with its expanding role as a water 
source for irrigation projects in the region, the flow of the Daule was to be diverted, 
transformed and commodified. Banana-export earnings, combined with a reverse flow 
of money from the U.S., were welded together with the flow of Daule water to 
circulate through the veins of the city, reshaping its landscape. But thus material flow 
of H2O, combined with and running through physical and social urban space, was just 
one node in an articulated whole of processes operating on a regional, national and, 
indeed, world-wide scale: flows of transformed nature, commodities (bananas) and   33
money; transfers of capital; and the buying and selling of labour power. The city 
would be transformed once more, with the political-economy of urbanization deeply 
caught up in the progress of the urbanization of water. The improved credit-
worthiness (bankability) of Ecuador led to increased international lending and a 
growing dependency of state utilities on external financing (see (Swyngedouw 1995)). 
This new scalar configuration of the water/banana nexus came to an early end 
beginning in the early 1960s. In the 1950s, a new and more resistant Banana variety, 
the Cavendish, was developed, allowing the fruit companies to switch their operations 
back to the more favourably located Central American locations, closer to ￿home￿, 
more reliable and under greater direct control of the U.S. state. This bio-engineered 
and phyto-technologically more demanding ￿Chiquita￿ banana (Le￿n 1992) was 
heavily commercialised internationally and undermined the economic position of the 
traditional Ecuadorian ￿Gross Mitchel￿ banana type. Only large Ecuadorian producers, 
connected to international merchants and fruit companies, were able to adjust 
ecologically and socio-economically to the requirements of the new cultivation, 
production and marketing techniques. Total banana export value fell from US$ 88.9 
million in 1960 to $ 51.5 million in 1965, recovering (nominally) to $ 94.3 million by 
1970. This overaccumulation of bananas wiped out thousands of small and medium 
sized producers, who joined the ranks of the urban underclass (BÆez 1985). The 
banana crisis again broke the coastal elite￿s partially restored power position. The 
state, in turn, was pushed to face the stagnant export position of Ecuador, as external 
debt rose rapidly.  
The exploitation of Amazonia’s huge oil reserves in eastern Ecuador after 
1972 signalled a new wave of rent extraction and redistribution. Existing socio-spatial 
and scalar relations were overhauled once more, as the actors organising the 
petroleum-boom produced a new set of scalar configurations. The ecological conquest 
of fossilised nature beneath the Ecuadorian Amazonian rainforest was, and is, 
exclusively based on international petro-capital. In contrast to the two earlier waves of 
agro export-based integration into the international market place (cocoa and bananas), 
mainly organised through the intermediation of a domestic commercial and financial 
oligarchy, this time the national state assumed the role of key interlocutor in 
organising the global-local articulation of oil. Indigenous Amazonian peoples were 
legally dispossessed, as the state became the de facto and de jure owner of the 
country￿s ￿natural￿ resources (Farrell 1989). This would, of course, put the state in the 
pole position in terms of organising the insertion of Ecuador into the global political 
economic framework, inevitably also turning the state apparatus into a major arena for 
social struggle. Oil revenues, partly monopolised by the state, triggered continuous 
political power conflicts over the control, appropriation, and direction of the new 
investments that now became possible. In addition, the oil-boom attracted 
considerable attention from foreign investors (mainly in services and banking). The 
majority of this private investment was increasingly attracted to the inland capital city 
of Quito, rather than Guayaquil, which had the advantage of proximity to key national 
and international power brokers.  
This time, the expansion of the ecological rent frontier was directed eastward 
into the Amazon basin rather than in the coastal regions. Oil, quite literally, flowed to 
the coastal port (for export) over the Andes through a newly constructed oleoduct, 
becoming transformed into money and capital. Quito became the country’s leading 
political and now increasingly international financial centre, leaving Guayaquil 
behind in its past, but now dimmed, glory. The oil rents appropriated by the state were 
reinvested, in turn, with an eye toward domestic industrialisation (Bocco 1987),   34
mainly in all sorts of infrastructure, from expanding port facilities, new freeways to 
airports, and a military built-up. Oil rents also served to augment the ecological basis 
on which the city’s sustainability was predicated, including widening the scale and 
scope of water control. The pumping, treatment, and conduction capacity of 
Guayaquil￿s water system was increased substantially (reaching 1,500 million m
3 in 
1995), taking ever more water from the Daule river and its tributaries. The expansion 
of the water system was largely financed from international loans, secured by 
promises of a continuing oil-boom, but a significant part of the urban population was 
deprived from easy access to potable water. The socio-economic crisis of the 1980s 
had led to a massive explosion of the city to over two million people, particularly in 
marginal estuary settlements and on the hills surrounding the old city. The lack of 
attention to water distribution and the absence of a piped network resulted in chronic 
problems of access to water for the urban poor and fostered a thriving private water 
economy.  
This institutional water chaos, enduring problems with water delivery, and the 
socially produced ￿scarcity￿ of water began to feed a discourse of liberalisation and 
privatisation in the early 1980s, with calls for a radical shift in water governance 
become increasingly loud from the early 1990s onwards. In addition, the neo-liberal 
policies that swept through Latin-America, combined with the structural adjustment 
policies and requirements for de-regulation as conditions for international lending set 
by the world￿s leading financial institutions produced a political, social, and economic 
environment that pushed, slowly and originally imperceptibly, for greater private 
sector participation and investment in the water sector. By the mid-1990s, it became 
abundantly clear that Guayaquil and Ecuador would follow the clarion call of the 
international political and economic elites. They set off on a course of privatisation, a 
trajectory that had now been hegemonically presented as offering the panacea for 
what had become a really intractable problem. Of course, there is nothing inevitable 
about privatisation, which is, in fact, a carefully orchestrated process by the State, 
usually in conjunction with international organisations that shapes the political, 
economic, and institutional conditions that eventually lead to a wholesale overhaul of 
the public services. In addition, selected media join the chorus to chant the virtues of 
privatisation and hail this as the panacea for all ills. Moreno Mendoza argues, for 
example, in Vistazo, a local magazine, how privatising water services will 
simultaneously deal with a recalcitrant labour force in the water company and solve 
the problem of informal ￿tanquero￿ water vending in the suburban areas (Moreno 
Mendoza 1998). 
A US$40 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to the 
government of Ecuador specifically required the privatisation of the water company in 
order to ￿improve the water and sanitation services to the city of Guayaquil￿. In fact, 
the loan included provisions to grant a long-term concession to the private sector to 
￿promote greater efficiencies of these [water and sewerage] services and investment 
in the system￿ (Inter-American-Development-Bank 1997). The loan was granted to 
enable the utility to undertake technical, legal, and financial studies to prepare bid 
specifications to award the concession. The water company would be reorganized to 
function as an oversight and regulatory agency (with a massively reduced work 
force), while the private sector would be responsible for operating the system. Only 
half of the loan (US$ 19.8 million) was earmarked for financing high-priority 
rehabilitation work to prevent further deterioration of existing infrastructure. The loan 
has a 25-year term at a variable rate, in 1997, of 6.9 per cent, and local counterpart 
funds totalled US$ 10 million. International bids were solicited, but despite the fact   35
that Suez-Lyonnaise and Thames Water (RWE) pre-qualified, International Water 
was the only company to bid. In January 2001, the utility confirmed that International 
Water had been awarded a 30-year concession to operate and administer the city￿s 
waterworks. A local subsidiary, Guayaquil Interagua C. Ltda., was established 
through an investment company (International Water Services B.V.) based in the 
Netherlands.   
International Water (IWL) is a truly global company. It originated in the early 
1990s as part of a series of partnerships between North West Water (NWW) (now 
United Utilities (UU)) and Bechtel (50 per cent), the US construction company. 
Bechtel purchased NWW￿s engineering division and created a joint water venture in 
the USA, US Water. International Water was created as a joint venture operating 
internationally outside the USA or the UK. UU sold their share to Edison Spa, an 
Italian company, in 1999, but remained as the agreed ￿operating partner￿ for 
International Water. IWL is globally active, with operations in, among others, 
Melbourne, Mexico City, and Sophia. It was also the contractor in the ￿failed￿ 
privatisation of Cochabamba￿s water supply system. All workers of the formerly 
public utility were dismissed and selectively rehired by IWL. After long negotiations 
Guayaquil Interagua agreed to contract most of the former employees, to provide 
training to those hired, and assistance and training for those who would not be re-
hired. Both training programs were funded by an Inter-American Development Bank 
loan, through its Worker￿s Transition Program. However, the company broke the 
agreement and contracted only about 20 per cent of former employees. Workers were 
taking legal action against the company (Acosta 2002). The World Bank￿s 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) signed a US$ 18 million 
guarantee in March 2001, offering protection for the investment against the risk of 
expropriation, war, and civil disturbance, and also covers a performance bond. This 
was the first time that MIGA had guaranteed a water project (Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency 2002), and it provides financial security from risk for the 
privatised water concession of IWL.  Of course, ultimately, this risk is also covered 
by the public purse. IWL had a disastrous experience in Cochabamba, Bolivia, where 
the privatised company was re-socialised after massive public protests, which took on 
a national significance and almost toppled the government, with a number of people 
being killed by the police (Gleick et al. 2002). After this, it became increasingly 
necessary for the World Bank and other organisations to insure private investments in 
the water sector against such ￿eventualities￿ that might jeopardise the long-term 
profitability of the investment. 
In the privatisation contract, IWL offered to create 55,238 new connections in 
the first five years, achieve 95 per cent service coverage by year ten of the concession, 
and invest US$ 520 million in the last 25 years of the period (Financial Times 
Information). It would be more than a miracle if they were able to achieve this. 
Operations of the private company started in April 2002. On 4 September 2002, it was 
reported that only 30 per cent of the customers pay their water bill. The price charged 
by the ￿tanqueros￿ for a tank of 200 litres of water stands now at US$ 0.80. After 
more than 100 years of some sort of public water supply, the Guayaquileæo￿s are now 
drinking water supplied for profit. The water of the river Daule is now flowing 
through privately organised water systems that turn water into profits for globally 
organised private companies. 
To summarize, the city of Guayaquil grew on the basis of successive 
ecological conquests and the appropriation of rents, from agricultural produce or the 
pumping of oil, through which money was continuously recycled and nature became   36
urbanised. The harnessing and urbanisation of water inserted water circulation 
squarely into the circulation process of money and its associated power relations and 
class differentiations. With each round of accumulation, the territorial scale of the 
socio-ecological complex changed and the scalar geographies of political power 
became re-articulated. A new configuration of elite would reorganise the socio-
ecological configuration of the urbanisation process and shape the hydrosocial 
networks according to its own interests and logic. The socio-economic, political, and 
institutional nesting (from the local to the global) through which cocoa, bananas, and 
oil (either in a commodity or money form) flowed took new forms. In addition, the 
hydrosocial flow became transformed and restructured, and expressed and reflected 
the changing social, political, and economic power relations at a variety of nested and 
articulated geographical scales; urban, regional, national, and international.  
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4. The politics of exclusion 
 
The above political-ecological analysis of water provides the backbone to 
considering a series of further case studies. These cases will show how the fusion of 
political and economic processes produce particular hydrosocial conditions 
characterised by social power relationships that shape mechanisms of access and 
exclusion in systematic manners.  
 
4.1. Guayaquil: State Power ￿ Private Power 
 
The current highly unequal access to water for a large number of urban 
residents is directly related to the particular political-ecological history through which 
water became urbanised (see above). A multiplicity of power relations constituted a 
choreography of water access and exclusion that reflected the changing geometries of 
power. First, the historical origin of the water system already structurally embedded a 
process of subsidization. As it were the elites who, through taxes levied by the state 
(which the elites controlled given the limited democratic content of state power at the 
time) on their economic activities, paid for the construction and management of the 
early water system, they surely felt they should not pay twice for their water. While in 
recent years, subsidization has invariably been portrayed as an unsustainable practice 
that was primarily aimed at the poor, the water management model in most 
developing and colonial countries was in fact, from its very inception, a subsidized 
model for the elites and the rich. They were indeed paying for the services through 
taxation. The latter of course made the expansion of the system dependent on the 
relative success of the local economic elites within the international division of 
labour. When international geo-economic conditions were favourable, the water 
system expanded; when crisis hit, the system stalled exactly at a time that urban 
populations expanded rapidly and social polarisation intensified.  
It is only from the mid 20
th century onwards that water services begin to be 
extended to include the poor or non-serviced areas of the cities; areas that had begun 
to expand rapidly as the rural socio-economic fabric begins to disintegrate and large 
scale rural to urban migration starts. The subsidized model of water supply now 
becomes systemically dependent not only on state subsidies but also on external 
funding and international lending. Irrespective of the private or public nature of the 
water management system, similar processes can be found across the developing 
world. Latin-American urban water institutions are often faced with the problem of an 
operating situation that generates structural deficits. This is quite different from a 
subsidized model in that such a system would still run on a standard balanced account 
management. A system running structural deficits operates on ad-hoc, piecemeal and 
￿emergency￿ interventions, loans, and subsidies from the national state or international 
lending bodies (Swyngedouw 1995). From the very beginning, the high cost of urban 
engineering works required high levels of (usually external) financing, while the 
political-economic forces in the city demanded low water prices. In short, the 
combination of below-cost pricing and the substantial amount of unaccounted for 
water serves particular interests. These are further accentuated in a context of 
widespread and deeply rooted clientelist political traditions. Any attempt at reducing 
financial losses by increasing prices or improving accounting practices would be 
deeply unpopular among the upper classes. In addition, implementing such price 
policies might lead to social unrest in the popular settlements, while improved 
policing of illegal connections or a more repressive stance to water theft might   38
deprive those for whom this strategy is often the only possible means of securing 
affordable access to at least some quantity of potable water. Either way, precarious 
social balances need to be maintained if social cohesion is to be assured.  
The precarious budgetary conditions of the water companies make them 
dependent on external sources of financing to make up for the deficit and/or to invest 
in new ventures. National subsidies or loans are rarely sufficient, so international 
financing is usually required to maintain or expand the system. The model of Third 
World urban water supply is based on external (international) financing, and this 
accentuates centralizing tendencies and favours large-scale engineering projects. In 
addition, the success or otherwise of such lending schemes is more than ever 
dependent on a successful and sustained export-based national economy. 
Consequently, the management and technology of urban water provision is deeply 
caught up in the political economies of national states, their entrance in and position 
within the global division of labour, and the strategies of the chief international 
private and public lending agencies. 
The deadlock in tariff increases, the negative returns on water sales, the 
historical preoccupation with massive engineering structures for the production and 
transmission of water, the ideological bias towards providing unlimited quantities of 
water to industry and higher classes, the chronic shortages of water as a result of 
accelerating urbanization, the dependence on external finance, the technological bias 
inherent in international lending, and the vulnerability to the vagaries of the global 
economy ￿  all these combine to result in a preoccupation with the production and 
transmission of potable water and a negligence of maintenance, accounting, 
distribution and consumption, not to speak of sewerage and the treatment of waste 
water. This, in turn, perpetuates the systematic exclusion of large parts of the 
population from access to the available water. These processes also enable private 
water distribution monopolies to prosper and to consolidate their power by means of 
water speculation and monopoly rent extraction. 
 
 The quasi-monopoly control held by these private water vendors over a key 
biological and social commodity allows for a massive concentration of social and 
economic power in their hands. This is most vividly illustrated by analyzing the water 
rents that can be extracted by the water vendors as a result of their exclusive access to 
potable water. First of all, there is an enormous discrepancy between the water price 
charged by the public water authorities for those that can enjoy the luxury of 
domesticated water and the price charged by private water vendors. In Guayaquil, 
private water vendors buy water from EPAP at 70 Sucre/m
3
 and this is sold (in 
September 1993) for 4,000 to 6,000 Sucre/m
3
 (800 to 1,200 Sucre for a tank of 55 
gallons or 200 litre. In the case of Guayaquil, the multiple can be up to 300 in 1993 if 
compared with the basic tariff charged by EPAP-G for households using less than 15 
m
3
 of water each month. This alone indicates that poor urban residents have to pay up 
to 30,000 per cent (thirty thousand per cent) more for their water (of an inferior 
quality) than the higher income residents living in urban sectors served by the public 
water system. In the context of a minimum wage (for those who have the luxury of 
being formally employed) of 60,000 Sucre (US$ 30) per month, an average family of 
four with one income earner on minimum wage, using about 100 litre of water a day, 
would spend US$ 7.50 per month on purchasing water (or 25 per cent of its 
disposable income). According to the Master Plan, in 1979 an average family of four 
would spend 173 Sucre (US$ 6.22) per month on water purchased from tanqueros. In   39
2002, the price to the consumer for a delivery of 200 liters had increased to US$ 0.80 
(although this officially set price is often arbitrarily increased by the water vendors). 
For an average family of four, using on average 25 liters per person per day, the total 
monthly cost amounts to US$ 12.40 in 2002, a considerable cost for the majority of 
families living in the invasion settlements.  
The increasingly acute water supply crisis gives the tanqueros a uniquely 
powerful economic position in the urban economy. They buy the water from the water 
company at a highly subsidized price. Until 1987, the price per cubic meter paid by 
the water vendors was 8.4 Sucre, a price that had remained unchanged since at least 
1979 (EMAP 1980). In 1990, the price had risen to 15 Sucre/m
3
 for domestic water 
and 70 Sucre/m
3
 for industrial water. Because of fraudulent practices (selling water 
bought as domestic water to industry), the water price in the city was increased to 70 
Sucre/m
3
 for all usages in October 1991. Despite attempts by the governor of the 
province to set maximum prices for a tank of 200 liter (55 gallons), the private water 
vendors are able to increase water prices arbitrarily. In 2000, an attempt was made to 
establish ￿official￿ prices, although these remain high for the customer. In September 
2002, the tanqueros were buying water from the water company at US$ 0.33 for 1,000 
liters and selling it to the urban residents at US$ 0.80 for a 200-liter (55 gallon) tank, 
a gross profit rate of almost 90 per cent. 
Table 5 shows the recent evolution of the real water price asked by the water 
vendors expressed in current dollar terms. The prices listed are ￿standard￿ prices, but 
these are frequently increased arbitrarily, for example under conditions of scarcity. 
Moreover, prices tend to go up in areas further away from the filling stations. For 
example, in Isla Trinitaria, prices tend to be 10 per cent to 25 per cent higher than 
elsewhere. A field survey in September 1993 indicated a price range varying from 800 
Sucre in Duran, 1,000 Sucre for water from the Daule 8 1/2 filling station (for Bastion 
Popular and surrounding settlements) and 1,200 Sucre for water coming from the new 
filling station located at Via a la Costa km 10. Over half of the tank-lorries are filled 
up at this station. The price can go up to 1,500 Sucre for 200 liter in Isla Trinitaria. By 
2000, after the dollarisation of the economy, the price was set at US$ 0.80. 
 
In sum, the position of the water supply system in much of Latin America is 
caught between the political-economic forces operating at the urban level, the struggle 
at the level of the State with respect to the allocation and distribution of resources, and 
the dependent position of these countries within the international division of labour. 
The above analysis does nevertheless suggest that the operation of the hydraulic 
system cannot be analysed independent from its organizational and institutional 
configurations and the relations of power that structure them. In short, the unequal 
access to water and the exclusionary practices of local water politics perpetuate and 
strengthen a system, which, in the end, is the result of a political-economic 
organization whose official aim is to eradicate the exclusionary practices it produced 
in the first place. The issues raised point to a key questions with respect to sustainable 
urban development in the Third World. The issue of sustainable urban development 
must raise the question of ’Whose water?’ and ’Whose city?’ needs to be sustained. 
The management of nature’s water and the management of the ’urban’ as a process of 
nature’s transformation must ask questions about a just distribution of the available 
resources. And this requires a greater democratisation of exactly the socio-natural 
metabolic processes through which nature becomes urbanised.  
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Table 5. Evolution of official and real water price (for a tank of 55 gallons or 200 
litres). 
 
Date     Official Price    Real Price  Exchange rate  Real Price 
     in Sucre       in Sucre     Sucre/US$     in U.S.$ 
 
1976            2.50            27.45       0.09 
13/08/79         4.00/8.00     27.80   0.14/0.29 
07/09/87            60.00     193.8      0.31 
14/07/88       60          80.00     436.2      0.18 
24/04/89           120.00     569.2       0.21 
05/07/89           150.00     600.0       0.25 
23/05/90     150         200.00     821.5      0.24 
20/03/91           250.00   1014.0       0.25 
14/07/91     200         300.00    1119.0     0.27 
31/08/91     250 
06/06/92           400.00   1477.0       0.27 
11/09/92      400         700.00/ 800.00    1828.0   0.38/0.44 
11/11/92      450 
22/04/93      550         800.00/1200.00    1895.0   0.42/0.63 
June  2002         80  US  dollarcents 
 
 





4.2. Mexico City, Mexico: Who says Scarcity? 
 
  Mainstream accounts of water shortages in the Mexico basin have suggested 
that water stress is the result of poor public and economic policy, which has led to the 
undervaluation of water (National_Academy_of_Sciences 1995).  As the well-
rehearsed argument goes, it is suggested that the undervaluation of water leads to 
excessive wastage. This argument has been the lynchpin for pro-privatization policy-
makers in Mexico (Castro 2006). However the issue of scarcity in the Mexico valley 
is not one of absolute scarcity but rather is a highly socially constructed phenomenon 
with drastically polarized social implications.  In poor neighbourhoods water 
consumption over prolonged periods of time is as low as 4 litres per person per day 
(pppd), while in wealthy areas consumption exceeds 100s of litres pppd (Castro 
2004). 
  The argument that public water services is to be blamed for conditions of 
scarcity is seriously undermined by the fact that Mexico City has, like most other big 
cities in the global south, a long history of private water provision through informal 
water vendors which supply water to communities that are either not connected to the 
City￿s water system or are living with the repercussions of unequally constructed 
conditions of drought.  Recognizing the historical private provision of water has 
significant implications for how one understands contemporary water debates in 
Mexico. On the one hand, recognizing the long history of commodified water 
provision, illustrates the deeply ideological nature of mainstream accounts of water   41
scarcity in Mexico as well as the erasure of the experiences of marginalized 
communities.  On the other hand, seeing that it is generally wealthy communities that 
historically have received public water services, while also consuming a 
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  a m o u n t  o f  w a t e r ,  M e x i c o ￿ s  ￿ s c a r c i t y ￿  i s  r e v e a l e d  t o  b e  s o c i a l l y  
polarized distribution problem rather than being a ￿natural￿ phenomenon (Castro 
2004). 
  Water conflicts have been an ongoing feature of the Mexico City 
Metropolitan Area (MCMA).  As a consequence of the socio-natural polarization of 
water distribution, throughout the 1980s community groups developed their own 
survival strategies through alternative funding schemes and drilling their own wells.  
However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s in a move of state repression aimed at 
consolidating Mexico￿s water system, the state government took over local wells.  At 
the same time as these appropriations were taking place, the state continued tolerating 
clandestine wells managed as private businesses that serviced MCMA￿s poorest 
residents.  In the 1990s the Mexican government implemented far-reaching reforms 
that aimed to consolidate state control of the water sector.  Increasing state control of 
water was a prerequisite for its eventual privatization.  In 1993, after lengthy 
negotiations with opposition parties, the Federal District granted concessions to four 
major consortiums, transferring responsibility for registry of users and extensive 
water metering and billing to private operators.  This action was met by public protest 
and civil disobedience centred on non-payment, destruction of water meters and 
popular protests (Castro 2004).  These tensions arose not only because of increased 
tariffs but also because public water provision in Mexico has historically been 
enshrined as a universal right in the constitution. As such, while water is supposedly a 
universal right essential to citizenship in Mexico, it is paradoxically at the same 
moment an increasingly commodified right (Castro 2006).  The struggles over water 
in Mexico are representative of a tension that all capitalist states face, specifically a 
need to facilitate economic growth while also ensuring that the state￿s and capital￿s 
legitimacy remain intact. As the Mexican state tries to curb its policies to be in 
accordance with neo-liberal principles, the only thing that has changed for the 
marginalized people of Mexico is that they are now simply confronted with a new 
form of privatized water.  Numerous tensions continue to exist as paradoxes of 
citizenship and scarcity continue to play an important role in the unfolding of 
Mexico￿s water politics. 
 
 
4.3 Durban, South Africa 
 
Durban serves as an intriguing case study. It brings to light some profound 
paradoxes around the nexus of water, money and social power. On the one hand, the 
municipally owned and managed service provider, eThekwini Water Services (eTWS) 
has made moves towards an egalitarian distribution of water through the development 
of a free basic allowance of 200 litres of water per household per day. On the other 
hand, the city has inflicted surprisingly punitive measures upon those unable to pay 
for bills beyond this free basic allowance (Loftus 2004). At one point, as many as 
1000 household disconnections were taking place within the municipality per day for 
non-payment of bills. Outbreaks of violence have not been uncommon, as 
disconnection bailiffs have targeted individual communities. Tear gas has been fired 
on several occasions and in one instance a disconnection bailiff was shot dead (Desai 
2002). In what appears to be a more conciliatory position, the municipality has since   42
implemented a policy of restricting rather than disconnecting household supplies. 
However, the effects, and the attitude of residents towards such restrictions, are 
relatively unchanged. 
The reasons for such a paradox are rooted in two features of Durban￿s 
arrangements for water provision. First, the municipality￿s bulk-water supplier, 
Umgeni Water, is a semi-commercialised entity, still under public ownership. This 
entity has encountered serious financial difficulties as it has sought to expand its 
profit-making divisions into new markets abroad and diversify its range of water 
services within South Africa. Whilst these commercial services are said to be ring-
fenced from the public service provision of bulk-water, difficulties in the former have 
automatically been passed on to the latter. Curiously, Umgeni Water has been very 
effective at raising finance but very ineffective at finding profitable outlets for this 
investment. Debt servicing has therefore necessarily had to come from its most 
reliable source of income, bulk-water provision (Loftus 2005). 
The second feature of Durban￿s waterscape is the omnipresence of 
infrastructures to measure and rationally order water provision at the household level. 
Many of the tensions generated over the provision of bulk-water are now embodied 
within this infrastructure. Thus, water meters, flow limiters and flow restrictors seem 
to have taken on an unusual power in regulating the rhythm of people￿s everyday 
lives. Residents in township areas, many of whom have been accustomed to an on-site 
supply of water available at all times, now find themselves facing arrears of up to 
R30,000 and are only able to access water at times dictated by an electronic flow 
limiter. A progressive block tariff in the municipality offers what is perceived as a 
measure of eco-social equity, in that consumers of higher volumes of water pay a 
higher Rand/kl charge. The result, however, is an ingrained bias against large 
households and a focus on a cold rationality in the distribution of water according to 
what are perceived to be biophysical as opposed to socially-defined consumption 
needs. The case of Durban thus shows the manner in which monetary power comes to 




4.4 Water Wars: The Experience of Cochabamba 
 
The establishment of a private water-service concession between Aguas del 
Tunari and the city of Cochabamba and the resultant social upheavals is perhaps the 
most notable water conflict arising from asymmetric hydrosocial power relations to 
date.  However, the conflict must be understood in the context of historical socio-
economic developments. With the rise of interest rates in the 1980s, which led to a 
ballooning national deficit and an economic downturn, Bolivia, under the tutelage of 
international monetary institutions, initiated a series of Structural Adjustment Politics 
aimed at stabilizing and ￿modernizing￿ the economy.  In the 1990s structural 
adjustments involved the implementation of a neo-liberal privatization agenda, which 
entailed either the outright sail of public enterprises or the establishment of public-
private concessions (Marvin and Laurie 1999).  The commodification of water in 
Bolivia￿s third largest city Cochabamba, was the capstone of this long period of pro-
market reforms.  In September 1999, under pressure from the World Bank, the 
Bolivian government awarded a 40 year concession, including both management and 
monopoly control of water resources to Aguas del Tunari (ADT), a consortium led by 
International Water Limited, a subsidiary of the U.S. giant Bechtel and Edison, a large   43
Italian energy company (Lobina 2000).  The concession between the consortium and 
city reflected the larger power relations between international financial institutions, 
corporations, the pro-market Bolivian state, and marginalized urban and rural 
residents. 
There were several pernicious outcomes that were the direct result of both the 
water concession itself, and the historical asymmetries in social power that animated 
its initial establishment.  ADT was the sole bidder for the Cochabama contract and as 
such was able to ensure that they would be guaranteed a profit return of 16%.  This 
guaranteed profit margin translated into a water-rate increase of between 35% and a 
100% in the cost of residential water installations (Crespo 2003). Considering that a 
significant number of Cochabama￿s residents are among the poorest of South 
Americas burgeoning urban populations, these rate increases were simply socially-
economically unmanageable.  The concession between ADT included the 
establishment of a private monopoly that granted the consortium the exclusive rights 
to water resources. Cochabamba and the surrounding region had a long-standing 
history of alternative systems for water supply based on cooperatives and local 
committees that generally served the city￿s poorest residents.  These traditional water 
rights, fundamental to smaller water suppliers, were in an authoritarian fashion 
expropriated with the establishment of the water the concession (Crespo 2003). 
These measures served to further marginalize Cochabamba￿s poorest 
residents, and moreover, served to increase popular resentment against a long period 
of pro-market reforms that had failed to reduce social inequalities.  As such, in 
January 2000, under the leadership of La Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y la 
Vida (The Coordinator for the Defense of Water and Life) an alliance of trade-unions, 
environmentalists, peasant farmers and youth, protests erupted which sought to 
challenge the legitimacy of the concession and drive the multi-national corporations 
out of Bolivia. Clashes between protestors and the state escalated until on April the 8
th 
2000, Victo Hugo Daza Argadona was shot and killed by an army captain.  It was 
only at this point that the Bolivian government took seriously the public outcry 
against commodified water provision and cancelled the concession with ADT and 
handed the control of water services over to La Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y 
la Vida.  The major players in the water concession left Bolivia, although Bechtel is 
now seeking $25 million in reparations for lost profits at the International Center for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Wagner, Orellana, and Shultz 2003). Owing to 
the highly secretive and exclusive nature of the arbitration court, it is unclear what the 
resolution will be.  However, it is clear that adding a further $25 million dollars on to 
the highly indebted Bolivian people will not help to alleviate poverty or increase 
inequitable access to water.     
One of the key lessons coming out of the Cochabamba￿s experience with 
water privatization is that social power configurations and socio-economic relations 
are not static but rather fluid and contestable.  Another lesson is that conflicts over 
water are not simply a matter of misaligned and mismanaged policies but rather are 
the result of historical asymmetries in socio-economic power. 
 
 
4.5 Lagos, Nigeria 
 
Dreams of privatizing Lagos water services have been on the mind of Lagos 
State Government since 1999; however, these dreams are now coming closer to 
becoming reality.  Pro-private interests are quick to point to Lagos￿ burgeoning   44
populations growth as a justification for private sector participation. It is also 
suggested that the state run services are incapable of addressing such growth 
(World_Bank 2004).  Invoking population growth as a justification for privatization 
has effects similar to suggesting that ￿scarcity￿ resides in nature (see below). In the 
case of Lagos, this hides the violent and fraudulent history that has left the city￿s 
infrastructure in such a dilapidated state (Gandy 2005). 
Despite early consultation between civil society organizations and the Lagos 
State Water Corporation concerning private participation in water delivery services, in 
a typical move that illustrates the state￿s interest collude with those of private interests 
- the Lagos State House of Assembly introduced the Lagos Water Sector Law 
(LWSL) without any public consultation (Babalobia 2005a).  The LWSL is essentially 
a move to establish the foundations for the privatization of existing infrastructure 
while doing little to help the impoverished majority that live without any piped water 
service provision.  
Close study of the LWSL illustrates that the new law will do little to alleviate 
the extreme poverty that is related to inadequate existing water delivery systems.   
Perhaps one of the most pernicious stipulations of the new law is that it gives the 
redefined LSWC the power to collect water fees from primary schools while also 
allowing the corporation to terminate services if the schools default on payments. This 
obviously has dramatic effects in a region that struggles to pay its teachers. With 
much broader implications, the proposed water privatization scheme would ensure 
that water tariffs in the Lagos area are subject to international pricing mechanisms 
such that if the Nigerian currency devalues, additional debt-servicing costs will be 
passed directly on to consumers.  In this situation, in a very concrete way the residents 
of Lagos are subject to the turbulence of global financial relations.  The loans that 
LWSL is about to accept from the World Bank will be spent solely on improving 
existing infrastructure rather than extending service to the estimated 9 million people 
without piped water service provisions (Babalobia 2005b).  As the state becomes 
more indebted, improved service provision is restricted to high profile areas while 
marginalized and poor communities will be left un-serviced.  In this respect, the 
hydrosocial polarization that typified Nigeria￿s colonial and post-colonial history is 
now being propagated through current water policies tied to the global financial 
architecture. 
As the LSWC continues its moves towards privatization under the tutelage of 
the World Bank, civil-society organizations that were originally excluded from 
discussions regarding Lagos Water Sector Law are working hard to ensure that their 
voices are heard.  After initially walking out of talks with the World Bank upon 
discovering that the Bank was withholding vital information concerning the nature of 
the loans being extended to the LSWC, civil society organizations have managed to 
establish a Community Water/Utility Board (CWB).  The CWB is intended to act as 
regulatory body overseeing the changing public/private nexus of water service 
provision and the implementation of the World Bank loan aimed at facilitating private 
participation.  While the civil-society organizations have been unable to fully impede 
the privatization agenda, their participation in regional water affairs has been a 
marked accomplishment given that the public is generally excluded from the highly 
secretive negotiations between the global financial institutions and states (Akpan 
2005).  The outcome of the LSWC privatization agenda is unclear at present, and it 
remains to be seen whether CWB has the necessary teeth to regulate the tight linkages 
between corporate interests, the state and the World Bank. One thing that does remain 
clear is that for the 9 million people who are not connected to piped water systems,   45
debates over the privatization of existing infrastructure operate on a scale that does 
not quite capture the magnitude of hydrosocial exclusion experienced in Lagos.   
 
 
4.6. Manila, The Philippines 
 
Throughout the early 1990s the Manila￿s publicly run water and sewerage 
service provider, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) had a 
dismal record of providing adequate services to the city￿s 11 million residents.  The 
MWSS was marred by corruption, indebtedness and erratic service provision, which 
led the then Philippine President Fidel Ramos to introduce the ￿Water Crisis Act￿.  
The ￿Water Crisis Act￿, which was sold to the public as a strategic response to the El 
Niæo effect and the associated ￿water shortages￿, gave the president authoritarian 
powers to push through his privatization agenda (Esguerra 2002).  Ramos￿ appeal to 
the impacts of El Niňo, in effect, occluded the social causes behind water shortages 
and poor service provision and shifted blame on to a ￿natural￿ phenomena.  In another 
strategic move aimed at paving the way for privatization, five months prior to 
accepting private bids on a water concession with the city of Manila, the Ramos 
government raised water rates by 38 % in August of 1996.  The aim of this move was 
to win public support through increasing public water rates such that the private bids 
would be lower than existing rates (Landingin 2003). 
In January 1997, two water concessions were established with two 
consortiums, Maynilad Water Services Inc. and Manila Water respectively, each 
composed of local corporate crony entrepreneurs and multi-national water 
corporations.  The bids of each consortium were well under the actual operating costs 
of Manila￿s water system.  However, this was an intentional move on behalf of each 
consortium; the aim was to secure the contracts with the intent of renegotiating the 
terms of the agreements afterwards.  With the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, the consortiums were faced with ballooning deficits denominated in US dollars 
and lower revenue generation.  This scenario proved disastrous for both the 
consortiums and the residents of Manila. As the world￿s financiers facilitated the 
outflow of capital from South-East Asia, the Philippine currency lost half of its value 
against the US dollar.  However, each consortium was in the long term protected 
against currency devaluations as the concession agreements allowed for the 
concessionaries to recoup their losses through increasing the tariffs to be paid by 
residents (Esguerra 2002). And sure enough, rates have sharply risen over the past 9 
years.  Maynilad water rates increased from 4.96 to 25.84 PhP per cubic meter in 
2005, an increase of 436%. Manila Water￿s rates have increase 700% from 2.32 in 
1997 to 15.65 PhP per cubic meter in 2003 (Hall et al. 2004). In addition to these 
massive rate increases, neither company has achieved the promised 24-hour water 
service provision, universal connections, reduced water loss, or delivered the $7.5 
billion in promised investment, all of which were part of the initial concessions (Hall 
et al. 2004). 
On February 2003, Maynilad issued a statement terminating its contract with 
MWSS, citing the inadequate performance of the regulatory body, El Niæo, and the 
Asian financial crisis as reasons for the failed contract.  In the end, this appeared to be 
part of a strategy that set the stage for a massive government bailout that is currently 
being orchestrated. The Maynilad concession has been marred by a continuing trend 
geared at shifting the financial burdens of the corporately mismanaged water delivery 
on to the residents of Manila through increased water tariffs, government bailouts and   46
increased indebtedness to global financial institutions.  From a corporate standpoint 
Manila water has done better, recording huge profits as it pushes the regulatory body 
into allowing increases in water tariffs (Landingin 2003). As suggested previously, 
these profits have placed further financial burdens on to the shoulders of Manila￿s 
residents.  
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5. The Shifting Political Economy of Water: Politics of Exclusion and 
Struggles for Access. 
 
Thus far, we discussed the various ways in which social power, money, and 
water intersect. Theoretical arguments were illustrated with historical and current case 
studies and with power conflicts and mechanisms that shape contemporary water 
politics in a number of cities and countries around the world. These examples are just 
a few of a proliferating number of cases. In the final two parts of this report, we shall 
summarize and explore some of the key issues related to current debates and practices 
associated with water delivery and water services worldwide. We shall pull out the 
key insights generated by the case studies described in this paper and elsewhere in the 
literature. 
 
5.1. The public/private nexus 
 
Despite the current debates over potential or actual shifts towards privatisation 
(a debate that is often couched in terms of an inevitable and necessary adaptation of 
national policies to the requirements imposed by a new global and de-regulated world 
economic order), there is in fact a long history of changes in the urban water supply 
sector. Indeed, as discussed above through some of the case studies, since the early 
days of large-scale water delivery systems, they have always been characterised by 
shifting configurations of public-private partnerships. Neither is inherently better 
suited to provide water. The public-private debate is largely irrelevant. The key 
question is the power geometry through which water ownership, control, distribution, 
and access is organised. 
Most international case studies demonstrate that the organisation of urban 
water supply systems can be broadly divided in four stages (Hassan 1998). The first 
stage continued up to the second half of the 19th century, when the majority of urban 
water supply systems (in the global North) consisted of relatively small private 
companies providing parts of the city (usually the richer parts) with water of varying 
quality (Goubert 1989). Water provision was socially highly stratified and water 
businesses were aimed at generating profits for the investors. This was followed by a 
period of municipalisation, primarily prompted by concerns over deteriorating 
environmental conditions, calls for a sanitised city (Cornut 2003), and dwindling 
returns for private operators. Profitability became subsequently a secondary concern 
and subsidies came from the general tax income (from either the local or the national 
state). This municipalisation was also supported by local elites whose health and 
environmental conditions were equally negatively affected by deteriorating sanitary 
standards in the city. It was during this era that water supply systems were 
consolidated, leading to a citywide standardised coverage of domestic water supply, 
coupled with a comprehensive sewage disposal system (albeit without treatment of 
sewage waters). Countries and cities in the developing world began to emulate, very 
often successfully so, the European model in the development of their own urban 
water works. The third phase started approximately after the First World War when 
the water industry, together with other major utility sectors (such as electricity and 
telecommunications), became part of a growing national concern (Bernstein 1955) 
(Littlechild 1986). The national state, with varying degrees of intensity of control, 
regulation, and investments, undertook a much greater role in public services 
provision (Parker 1997). Water infrastructure became   -- together with other major 
infrastructure works and programs --  part of a Fordist-Keynesian State-led social and   48
economic policy. The investments in grand infrastructure works (dams, canals, 
networks, irrigation systems) were part of, on the one hand, an effort to generate 
and/or support economic growth, while, on the other hand, assuring a relative social 
peace by means of re-distributive policies (Gandy 1997). Three objectives were 
central to this Fordist period of expansion of water provision: the creation of jobs, the 
generation of demand for investment goods from the private sector and, finally, 
providing basic collective production and consumption goods (like water, food, 
education, housing) at a subsidised price for wage workers and industry alike. In some 
instances, water provision was nationalised (as in, for example, the UK and many 
developing countries). In other cases, although management remained under the 
auspices of municipal authorities, the state played an ever-increasing role, particularly 
in financing infrastructure projects (in, for example, France, Ecuador, Spain or Israel), 
but also by means of greater regulatory intervention. It was indeed also during this 
period that a variety of regulatory bodies (for social, economic, quality, or 
environmental regulation) were established, usually by and at the level of the national 
state. These institutional changes also assured that a particular constellation of ￿stake- 
holders￿ (consumers, unions, etc￿) would become involved. In short, the water sector 
became an integral part of the Fordist and corporatist state form. 
During the fourth and most recent phase, roughly starting with the global 
recession of the 1970s, a period associated with the demise of state-led economic 
growth and the subsequent transition to post-Fordist or flexible forms of economic 
development and state guidance (Moulaert and Swyngedouw 1987), a major shift took 
place in the public/private interplay in the water sector. First of all, mounting 
economic problems  -- in the context of high social and investment spending ￿ 
resulted in growing budgetary difficulties for the national (and often also local) state. 
This necessitated a reconsideration of the direction of state spending and resulted in 
reduced expenditures in the welfare sector and in supporting debt-ridden industrial 
sectors or expansive infrastructure programs (Ruys 1997). The low prices, the 
subsidised water investments, and the ageing water infrastructure, combined with a 
still growing water demand, put an ever greater pressure on state budgets; a pressure 
that ran counter to the above processes. This was particularly acute in the developing 
world. The borrowing bonanza of the 1970s, when western capital was desperately 
seeking outlets in the Third World to recycle overaccumulated capital (petro-dollars 
in particular) that could not find profitable investments in the crisis-ridden developed 
world, turned increasingly sour during the 1980s as the debt mountain rose (Corbridge 
1993). Debt repayment problems combined with desperate attempts from Western 
financiers to safeguard their positions prompted a whole range of imposed ￿Structural 
Adjustment￿ programs aimed at stabilising the international monetary order, but 
leaving states in the developing world with the unenviable task of cutting back on 
spending, privatising, and de-regulation. Second, the call for greater competitiveness 
as a means to re-dress the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s prompted a 
quest for efficiency gains and greater productivity through cutting red-tape, labour-
market de-regulation, and greater investment flexibility. This, in turn, was 
accompanied by privatisation tendencies as a means to pursue both of the above 
recipe-solutions to the crisis of Fordism. Moreover, the growing globalisation of the 
economy and the accompanying change in the nature of competition, the greater 
availability of private capital achieved by means of de-regulation and de-
territorialisation of financial markets, and the imposition of strict norms (by super-
national organisations like the EU, the World Bank, or the IMF) further accelerated 
the shift of the boundary between the public and private sectors in water management   49
more in favour of the latter. Third, the standard democratic, but corporatist (and often 
clientelist and crony-based), channels of government often infused by the presence 
and active lobbying power of social organisations  -- most notably unions ￿ proved to 
be a considerable barrier for implementing swift policy-changes. The political-
economic configuration has, consequently, changed in important ways, resulting in 
new institutional arrangements (see below) that permit a more business- or market-
oriented management that is more in tune with profit-making strategies (Ogden 1991) 
(Ogden 1995) (Jessop 2002). Fourth, the aging water infrastructure and the ever 
expanding need for new investment in the developing world to keep pace with a 
rapidly growing population required massive capital investment; something the state 
could not any longer marshal given the macro political-economic conditions. Fifth, 
the growing environmental problems and, consequently, the proliferating number of 
actual and potential conflicts in the management and regulation of the hydrosocial 
proved to be a serious challenge for traditional forms of organisation and 
implementation of water-related activities. Particularly in a context in which civil 
society-based environmental groups became more vocal and powerful, systems of 
governance had to become more sensitive to these issues.  The internalisation of all 
these tensions within a fundamentally state-owned and state-controlled sector like 
water became increasingly difficult. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, investors 
began to search for new frontiers for capital investment. Water presented itself as a 
possible new source to mobilise and harness as it offered the possibility for turning 
H2O (again) into capital and profit. This privatisation of the commons through a 
strategy of ￿accumulation by dispossession￿ (see (Harvey 2003) became increasingly 
central to accumulation dynamics as the standard routes of restructuring of existing 
capitalist-economic processes and investments in new products were not longer 
sufficient to absorb the ballooning volume of capital in search of profitable 
investment avenues. Indeed, water, together with other common pool goods like 
genetic codes, local knowledges, and the like, are rapidly becoming part of such 
accumulation strategies (Katz 1998). Capitalism has of course always been and will 
continue to be a system that attempts to break down all existing barriers and to 
incorporate everything into its own profit-seeking logic. Nature itself has long resisted 
full commodification, but in recent years, nature and its waters have become an 
increasingly vital component in the relentless quest of capital for new sources of 
accumulation. Of course, this privatisation of water does not take place in a vacuum, 
but involves centrally the transfer of ownership of water, infrastructure, and the like 
from the public sector, from local ownership or control, from forms of collective or 
socialised ownership to often globally organised private water companies. The new 
accumulation strategies through water privatisation imply a process through which 
nature￿s goods becomes integrated into global circuits of capital, local common goods 
are expropriated, transferred to the private sector and inserted in global money and 
capital flows, stock market assets, and portfolio holdings. A local/global 
choreography is forged that is predicated upon mobilising local H20, turning it into 
money, and inserting this within transnational circuits of circulating capital. Local 
resource systems become consequently part of the strategic checkerboard of global 
companies. As Table 6 indicates, the rush towards privatising water continuous 
relentlessly and constitutes currently a global market valued at over 45 billion US$. 
Needless to say, the appropriation of water by global market players is driven by 
considerations of competitiveness, profitability, ability to pay of customers, and 
strategic considerations. Humanitarian motivations such as providing water to the 
poor, improving life expectancy or health, and contributing to overall development   50
have become derived objectives; objectives that are explicitly stated in private 




Table 6. Water and Sanitation Privatisation.  
 
Proportion of Water and Sanitation Services Privatised 
1997 and 2010 projected 
REGION  % Privatised, 1997 % Privatised, 2010 Value of privatised 
market (US$, billions) 
Western Europe  20  35  10 
Central and East 
Europe 
4 20  4 
North America  5  15  9 
Latin America  4  60  9 
Africa 3  33  3 
Asia 1  20  10 
 
Source:  Anton E.; data from www.thewaterpage.com (accessed 5 September 2005) 
 
 
The combined effect of the above processes and dynamics resulted in a more 
or less radical shift (and with varying degrees of intensity in different countries), both 
in practice and ideologically/discursively, from a state-led and ￿managed water sector 
to one that is or has to be more in tune with globalised market forces and with the 
imperatives of a competitive privatised economy. In other words, a new hegemonic 
meta-governmental discourse emerged in the water sector, which was articulated 
around fiscal prudence, competitiveness, privatisation, the commodification of nature 
and environmental anxieties (Hajer 1995). In some cases, actual privatisation has 
taken place (such as in the UK and in many cities around the world), in other cases 
(such as in Amsterdam, Brussels, Durban or Seville) publicly owned companies are 
increasingly required to act strategically, managerially, operationally, and 
organisationally as a private company. In addition, water businesses are now often 




5.2. The demand-supply-investment trialectic in a ￿competitive￿ context  
 
In a context of commodification and demands for privatisation, the traditional 
state-led way of managing the triad of demand-supply-investment decisions becomes 
fundamentally transformed (see also below). If the profit motive, either for public or 
private companies, becomes the yardstick against which performance is measured and 
the price signal a key instrument for regulating the demand/supply nexus, the 
contradictions between these moments in the economic process take a rather different 
turn. In an external context, in which expanding demand is seriously discouraged for 
environmental reasons, while investment needs to be maintained to extent, replace, 
and update the network, the balance sheet equations for water supply companies 
become rather specific. With a given demand structure, and with increasing   51
investment, profitability (and hence the sustainability of market-led water companies) 
can only be maintained via either productivity increases (which are generally capital 
and technology intensive and almost invariably lead to a rising organic composition of 
capital and a reduction in the work force) and/or price increases. While the latter is 
possible, it remains politically sensitive and might lead to socially perverse effects. 
The social conflicts after the many privatization programmes are a case in point (see 
(Gleick et al. 2002).  
In a context of increasing demand and expansion of either total or per capita 
demand, the volume of profits can be maintained by means of an expansion of supply. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that the ￿productivist￿ logic of water supply 
companies (see (Swyngedouw 1995) continues unabated (despite mounting calls for a 
more restricted water use). Furthermore, given the long-term and capital-intensive 
nature of investments in water infrastructure, there is a rather weak incentive to 
engage in major long-term and capital-intensive investment programs. Put simply, 
there is a clear disincentive to invest in not directly profitable activities like leakage 
control in contrast to productivity enhancing investments. Finally, in a context of 
geographically limited supply and demand in which most companies operate, while 
simultaneously being exposed to a rapidly globalizing competitive environment, there 
is a tendency for privatised water companies to internationalise activities, either by 
taking over privatised water businesses elsewhere or by means of mergers, 
acquisitions and/or diversification into other sectors, or by selling their ￿know-how￿ 
overseas.  
It is not a surprise, therefore, that the state or other parts of the public sector 
have to mediate these contradictions. In the UK, for example, Yorkshire Water 
proposed to collectivise the network part of the water supply system, while keeping 
the managerial part in private hands, while the Welsh water utility also moved away 
from private ownership to some mix of public and private management (Bakker 
2003). In the case of Greece, the preparation for privatisation significantly involved 
splitting the water company into two parts, a publicly owned company that 
maintained the assets (technical infrastructure and network) and a privatised (up to 
49%) water supply company that would manage the system (see (Kaika 2005). It 
seems that this kind of public-private partnerships, in which the public sector is 
responsible for long-term fixed capital investments (and much of the costs associated 
with them) while the private sector organises the profitable part of the system (supply 
management) is the likely outcome of a privatised water business. The escalating 
infrastructure replacement and extension costs, their long turnover time, and long-
term investment uncertainty result in a very low return and a general caution on the 




5.3. A Dangerous Liaison: Finite Resources and Produced ￿Scarcity￿ 
 
 
Because of growing awareness of the central importance of water for human 
development, water issues have risen high on the environmental agenda, while being 
simultaneously subjected to market logic. In fact, these two dynamics are mutually 
intertwined. Increasing attention is paid to demand management, mainly as a result of 
the growing environmental awareness and the risk of dwindling water resources 
(Bakker 1999b) (Haughton 1998). This has intensified the political and social debate   52
about the ￿scarcity￿ of water (Nevarez 1996). As Ka￿ka has pointed out, this 
discursive built-up of a particular water narrative and ideology, particularly noticeable 
during, for example, the drought-related crisis conditions in Athens in the early 
eighties, serves specific political and economic objectives and policies (Kaika 2003a). 
Similar tactics emerged in the summer of 2002 in Sicily, in the context of a local 
drought that intensified debate over the need for more infrastructure, a politics that re-
enforced existing local power geometries, in which, for example, organised crime 
plays an important role (Giglioli 2006). A climate of actual, pending, or imagined 
water crisis, i.e. the discursive production of the immanency of a hydro-socio-
ecological disaster, not only serves to facilitate further investment in the expansion of 
the water-supply side (as in the case of Athens, Guayaquil, Delhi, or Seville), it also 
fuels and underpins drives towards commodification (see also (Bakker 2000) 
(Haughton 1998). As the price signal is hailed as a prime mechanism to manage 
￿scarcity￿, the discursive construction of water as a ￿scarce￿ good becomes an 
important part of a strategy towards commodification, if not privatisation. In this 
context, strange and often unholy political alliances are forged between advocates of a 
market perspective on the one hand and parts of the environmental movement on the 
other (Swyngedouw, Page, and Kaika 2002). To the extent that the latter￿s concern 
about the increasing, but socially constructed, scarcity of water has become more 
effective in mediatising this message to the wider public, a greater willingness-to-pay 
and the acceptance of the market mechanism as the preferred signal to allocate 
socially the resource become seen as more acceptable, if not presented as the only 
alternative available.  While environmentalists keep on insisting that water is a scarce 
and finite good and, consequently, needs careful handling, the private water sector 
and governments at all geographical scales embrace this discourse of ￿scarcity￿. A 
market economy of course requires ￿scarcity￿ to function. Without ￿scarcity￿, a 
market-based solution or mechanism would simply not work. If need be, therefore, 
￿scarcity￿ will be effectively ￿produced￿, socially engineered (Davis 1998). Moreover, 
this ￿manufactured￿ scarcity is invariably presented as residing in nature, even up to 
the point to ￿blaming￿ social conflict over water on nature (see Figure 3). Clearly, 
urban water riots have nothing to do with an absolute scarcity of potable water in the 
city, but everything with an uneven distribution between rich and poor, between the 
powerful and the powerless. 
In fact, water is one of the least finite resources in the world. It is plentiful and 
virtually non-exhaustible. There may be local or regional limits and problems with 
quality (itself usually negatively affected by human use and pollution) and reliable 
availability, but there is no evidence of global shortages of water. An environmental 
ideology that persists in representing water as inherently ￿scarce￿ invariably nurtures a 
commodifying and privatising logic. In fact, the World Bank, the European Union as 
well as private companies celebrate this continuous recycling of the idea of ￿water￿ as 
a scarce good. It provides an excellent legitimating device for pushing through neo-
liberal and market-driven policies, and serves particular social and economic power 
positions. Indeed, markets thrive on real or imagined ￿scarcity￿. Many environmental 
organisations with their real concern for important green issues find themselves in an 
unholy but objective alliance with those political and economic forces for whom the 
privatisation of nature is a mere ploy to maximise accumulation, deregulate markets, 
and chase new profits. Moreover, it takes attention away from the political nature of 
￿scarcity￿ as socially and politically ￿produced￿ and focuses instead on the available 
technological fixes.    




























Figure 3. Blaming urban water scarcity on nature (extract from The 




The management of the hydrosocial cycle and, in particular, the management 
of demand operates largely via a combination of campaigns aimed at raising public 
awareness about water savings on the one hand, and attempts at reducing water 
consumption by means of a variety of technological fixes on the other (Kallis and 
Coccossis 2001). Generally the cost effectiveness of water saving devices depends 
both on the price of the technology and the price of water. In a context of low water 
prices, water-saving devices are often not cost-effective. Although it is still disputed 
what the aggregate effect is on water savings (most studies indicate a slow-down in 
the growth of water demand, but not a reversal of upward trends), the technological 
fix for water-related problems requires significant investments. Privatised water 
companies remain reluctant to invest in such technologies (given the cost 
implication), while public subsidies might be seen as a subvention to the private 
sector (in the case of a privatised water sector) or run against the dominant ideology 
of full cost recovery (in case of public companies). Despite availability, therefore, of a 
wide range of water-saving devices and technologies, uptake remains limited and is 
not likely to have a major impact in the near future. More importantly, the 
displacement effects (in terms of the environmental implications associated with the 
development and production of new technologies) is almost invariably completely   54
ignored and not part of the environmental audit. Yet, it is abundantly clear that 
environment-friendly technologies when applied in one sector might have adverse 
effects in terms of the environmental effects of their own production process. A total 
environmental audit would be required in order to assess the net environmental 
benefit derived from a technological fix.   
 
 
5.4. The Global Water Nexus 
 
5.4.1 Globalisation through Shared Control   
 
     The supply of water is increasingly embedded in processes of economic 
globalization. Whether publicly or privately owned, water businesses are expanding 
their operations geographically and they have become involved in an international 
competitive process. In the case of privatized companies, furthermore, their capital 
structure is also becoming increasingly internationalized. For example, after the UK 
government sold its ￿golden share￿ in December 1994, it opened the way for a 
frenzied spree of mergers and international takeovers. Many UK water companies are 
actively acquiring water operations elsewhere in the world, while British companies 
have been subject to takeover from foreign competitors. For instance, Thames Water 
(London￿s water supply company) was acquired in September 2000 by the German 
multi-utility RWE. The part-privatization of the Athens water company turned 
EYDAP into a stock market listed company and, hence, subject to the vagaries of 
national and international capital markets. At a global scale, an accelerated process of 
concentration and consolidation is taking place that is rapidly leading to a fairly 
oligopolistic economic structure of water utility companies, with two (French) 
companies controlling about 70% of the global privatized water market (Hall 1999) 
(Hall 2001). Aside from the difficulties of regulating global companies (particularly 
with respect to environmental and social standards, investments, maintenance and 
infrastructure upkeep), this trend raises the specter of increasing geographical 
strategies around investments and about the spread of activities, the flow of water-
capital, and the portfolio of holdings.   
Indeed, the ￿market￿ does not exist as a playing field without the actors 
making it work. The small number of global water companies produces an 
oligopolistic form of market organisation. As Table 7 shows, only a handful 
companies control the water market. In fact, two French companies (Ondeo (Suez) 
and Vivendi) take an overwhelming share of the water market, with Thames Water 
(part of the German multi-utility RWE) and SAUR trailing far behind in respectively 
third and fourth place. The dominance of the French is related to their long-term 
preferential access to the French water market. This gave them a competitive edge in 
international markets once they became more deregulated and were prepared for the 
privatisation onslaught. Moreover, The French tradition has always combined state 
investment in infrastructure with private management of water delivery services. This 
strategy is evidently more profitable for the private sector and French companies have 
successfully exported this model. The Anglo-Saxon model is rather based on full 
privatisation (infrastructure and delivery) and the export of this model has resulted in 
several failures or under-performing utilities.  
The four top companies are invariably involved in basically every urban 
privatisation scheme in the world. Moreover, for big projects, it is not unusual for the 
big four or five to share the spoils and either to manage water systems jointly or to   55
carve up the concession into two geographical areas, each controlled by one of the 
global players. For example, in Budapest, Vivendi has a joint venture with RWE 
Aqua, and in Sidoargo, Indonesia, RWE runs one part of the system while Vivendi 
controls the other half. These joint ventures and joint bids for contracts further erode 
whatever limited ￿competition￿ exists in the market. The market for privatising urban 
water is far removed from the competitive ￿environment￿ that neo-liberal pundits hail 
as the saviour of ailing economies in the third world. Needless to say, such 
oligopolistic control provides considerable leverage for the corporate mandarins when 
negotiating terms with local or national states.        
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Vivendi are for 2000 and Data for Anglian Water Group are for 1999. 
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5.4.2 Cherry-picking as Strategic Device 
 
Servicing urban residents with reliable potable water services is not an easy 
business. It requires significant long term investment, and complex organisational and 
management arrangements. And profitability is by no means assured, particularly in 
urban environments where many people have a low ability to pay and problematic 
access conditions. In short, only some urban water systems are likely to generate the 
prospect for long-term profitability, while others will continue to require subsidies 
and support if they are to continue to improve service delivery. Recent experiences 
have indeed shown that global private companies only really go for the nice bits; 
those that have some meat on the bone. That means that only big city water works are 
considered worthy of privatisation. And within those cities, areas with high-income 
residents with proven ability to pay are of course the valued customers of the 
privatised utilities. This of course leads to strategic ￿cherry picking￿ from the part of 
the companies (Graham and Simon 1994). The ￿promising￿ utilities (in terms of 
prospects for profit making) are cleared for privatisation; the smaller and usually less 
profitable utilities remain in public hands and require continuous subsidisation. 
Moreover, contractual obligations have to be written into concession arrangements to 
force companies to expand service provision in poorer areas. Rarely, however, do 
private service providers fulfil all the terms of their contractual obligations.   
In sum, strategic cherry picking is just a variation on a recipe long proven 
successful in capitalism: privatize profitable business and let the taxpayer cough up 
the subsidies for unprofitably, but still essential, services. And the latter are invariably 
those on which the sustainability of the poorest groups of the population depends 
crucially.   
 
5.4.3 Corruption as Institutionalised Practice 
 
The inevitably strong link between the state and the private sector in 
privatisation schemes opens up all manner of corrupt practices. They may be illegal, 
but more often than not, belong to the standard arsenal of agreed practices and 
accepted procedures. Needless to say, forms of bribery, under-the-table deals, 
greasing hands to facilitate certain contractual arrangements and financial 
contributions to political allies, all belong to the standard tool-kit of privatised water 
utilities. The concession contract for Jakarta with Thames Water (now RWE) had to 
be renegotiated after allegations of corruption. Bribery scandals were also associated 
with the concessions in, among others, Grenoble, Tallinn, Lesotho and in Kazakhstan. 
Enron, Vivendi, and Suez have all been accused of making payments to political 
parties in return for favours.  
Not more subtle, but fully legal inducements for privatisation are offered by 
national states and international organisations. For example, World Bank loans to the 
water sector are generally conditional upon spending a considerable share of the loan 
on managerial and other streamlining measures to prepare the groundwork for water 
privatisation. In the case of Guayaquil, Ecuador, for example, the Inter-American 
Development Bank provided a $ 40 million loan under condition that almost half of it 
would be spend on preparing the privatisation bid of the public water utility (Hall and 
Lobina 2002) (Swyngedouw 2004). In sum, international loans and other 
arrangements are used as a means to push through this neo-liberal agenda. 
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5.5. The Continuing Importance of the State 
 
5.5.1 The Myth of the Neo-Liberal Model 
 
The water privatisation business foregrounds also one of the central myths of 
the neo-liberal model, i.e. that privatisation means getting the state off the back of the 
economy and rolling back regulatory red tape. This rolling-back of the state is further 
legitimized on the basis that the state has ￿failed￿ in many developing countries to 
deliver the required services. While this is undoubtedly the case for a number of 
countries, it can also be argued that in many cases the state has been remarkably 
successful in delivering services to a large number of people. However, regardless of 
the argument in favour of reduced state intervention in the water sector, the state or 
other governing arrangements (from multi-lateral organisations like The World Bank, 
IMF, or the EU to national governments, to the local state) are centrally involved in 
￿regulating￿ and ￿organising￿ privatisation. They change laws, rules, and conventions 
and produce new legal and institutional frameworks that permit and ￿regulate￿ 
privatisation, often imposing all manner of conditions and constraints that force 
privatisation through. In addition, governments provide all manner of financial and 
other incentives to lure private companies, to foster private sector involvement, and 
the like. After privatisation, a state controlled regulatory institutional framework 
invariably has to be implemented, just to make sure that companies ￿behave in 
competitive ways￿. Without the various state levels paving the way for and imposing 
conditions that guarantee privatisation, and to secure profitable operation afterwards, 
this accumulation by dispossession could not possibly take place. The state is, in other 
words, a central actor in establishing and maintaining ￿market principles￿. 
Privatisation, therefore, does not roll back the state, but it changes the role of the state 
while not necessarily diminishing its role. 
The tendency towards commodification and privatisation changes the 
regulatory context in important ways (see also below). While moves towards 
commodification and privatisation are legitimated on the basis of considerations of 
increased competitiveness, higher productivity, lower prices, and drastic cutback in 
bureaucratic regulation, there has been a tendency to equate those shifts in the 
economic forms of organisation with de-regulation. However, evidence from the 
water sector suggests exactly the opposite. New institutions, most notably in the field 
of economic and environmental regulation, accompany every privatisation 
programme. As Bakker (Bakker 1999a) (Bakker 2001) has pointed out in the context 
of the U.K., the regulatory game that started with the privatisation (and ostensibly de-
regulation) unleashed a certain ￿regulatory creep￿, which has subsequently developed 
into a top-heavy institutional-regulatory body. Given the territorial monopoly-
character of the privatised water companies, all sort of regulatory procedures, such as 
investment target-setting, pricing, environmental standards, abstraction and leakage 
standards, quality assurance, and the like, have been implemented. Having shifted 
from a situation in which the state was both ￿poacher￿ and ￿gamekeeper￿ to one in 
which there is a sharp institutional separation between the two has inevitably led to a 
situation in which ￿regulations￿ have become formal, overt and statutory 
(Swyngedouw, Page, and Kaika 2002). Rather than de-regulating the water sector, 
privatisation has resulted in a profound re-regulation of the water market and in the 
emergence of a considerable quasi-governmental regulatory structure.    58
The struggles over the boundary between the public and the private terrain 
operate primarily through two interrelated axes: first, environmental standards and, 
second, market imperatives. The tension between these becomes contained in the 
pursuit of environmentally friendly marketization, while the public/private tension is 
meditated through debates over the form that the commodification process should 
take. Unanticipated consequences of these debates are seen in the changing character 
of knowledge within the water sector. Information that was once in the public domain 
becomes commodified, takes on commercial significance and is often treated as 
confidential. In the context of a shift to governance, knowledge management is central 
to playing the regulatory game. Retaining control of technical institutions remains an 
important vehicle for government bodies (at a variety of scales) to preserve its relative 
advantage within negotiations. But despite the apparent centrality of such debates 
about public and private spheres, it is clear that state-led command-and-control 
strategies remain the key mechanism for the implementation of environmental 
regulations (Taylor 1999). Governments are not just instrumental as initiators and 
facilitators of privatisation; they also play a central role in guaranteeing profitability 
or insuring companies against adverse political or economic conditions. For example, 
the World Bank insured International Water￿s concession in Guayaquil, Ecuador to 
the tune of US$ 18 billion against all sorts of risk, including political instability (Hall 
and Lobina 2002). 
In sum, rather than de-regulating the water sector, privatisation has resulted in 
a profound re-regulation of the water market and in a considerable quasi-
governmental regulatory structure. In the process, the set of social actors involved in 
the institutional and regulatory framework of the water sector has been significantly 
altered, with a new geometry of social power evolving as a consequence. This new 
choreography of institutional and regulatory organisation is what we shall turn to 
next. 
 
5.5.2 Institutional re-scaling: from water government to water governance 
 
A host of new institutional or regulatory bodies have been set-up (in the UK 
appropriately called Quango￿s (quasi-NGOs)) that have considerable decision-making 
powers, but operate in a shady political arena with little accountability and only 
limited forms of democratic control. These institutional changes have been invariably 
defined as part of wider shift from government to governance (Swyngedouw 2000) 
(Jessop 2002). Whereas in the past, water management and water policy were directly 
or indirectly under the control of a particular governmental scale, i.e. either at the 
national state and/or the local (municipal) level, in recent years there has been a 
massive proliferation of new water-related institutions, bodies, and actors that are 
involved in policy-making and strategic planning at a variety of geographical scales. 
For example, the successive generations of water-related directives and regulations at 
the EU level and the torturous process of implementing an integrated EU policy ￿ in 
the form of the European Water Framework Directive --  have resulted in growing 
powers of the Commission over water-related issues. The political history of the 
successive stages of negotiating the framework directive suggests a rather tumultuous 
path in which various actors (such a national governments, water providers, the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, NGOs of a variety of kinds) played 
different roles, while their influence changed over time (Kaika 2003b) (Kaika and 
Page 2003) (Page and Kaika 2003). In addition ￿ as the UK case shows  -- 
privatisation required setting-up a series of new regulatory bodies (OfWAT in   59
particular) and a re-definition of the powers and prerogatives of existing regulatory 
organisations such as those of the National Rivers Authority that became integrated in 
the newly created Environment Agency. The attention to Integrated Water Resources 
Management has also called for setting up new planning and management bodies like 
River Basin Authorities. While welcome in themselves and despite calls for 
implementing ￿participatory governance￿ principles, the actual management of such 
bodies remains often largely outside standard democratic channels. 
The combined outcome of the above has been a more or less significant (very 
significant in the case of the UK, less so in the case of, say, the Netherlands) re-
configuration of the scales of water governance. As Bob Jessop (Jessop 1994) has 
pointed out for other domains of public life, the national scale has been re-defined 
(and partially hollowed-out) in terms of its political power, while supra-national and 
sub-national institutions and forms of governance have become more important. 
Privatisation, in turn, has led to the externalisation of a series of command and control 
functions. The result is a new scalar ￿gestalt￿ of governance, characterised by a multi-
scaled articulation of institutions and actors with varying degrees of power and 
authority. The overall result, therefore, is a ￿glocalisation￿ (Swyngedouw 1997) of the 
national government, both upwards to the supra-national level and downwards to the 
sub-national level. This results in a more complex articulation of varying geometries 
of scale-dependent forms of governance. In sum, national governmental regulation is 
simultaneously up-scaled and downscaled, with an accompanying change in the 
choreographies of power, both between and within institutions (see also below).  
Finally, privatization itself of course results in much greater power and 
autonomy for the companies themselves in terms of strategic and investment 
decisions. Privatisation de facto means taking away some control from the public 
sector and transferring this to the private sector. This not only changes decision-
making procedures and strategic developments, but also affects less tangible elements 
such as access to information and data. Traditional channels of democratic 
accountability are hereby cut, curtailed, or re-defined. A plethora of new institutions 
has been formed at a variety of geographical scales. This proliferation of ￿governing 
bodies￿ has diminished the transparency of the decision-making process and renders it 
more difficult to disentangle and articulate the power geometries that shape decision-
making outcomes. In practice, it can be argued that the transition from government to 
governance has implied ― despite the multiplication of actors and institutions 
involved in water management― the transfer of key economic and political powers to 
the private component of the hydrosocial governance complex. This, however, has not 
happened in a social vacuum and has rather fuelled a constellation of social and 
political conflicts, not least because of the consequences of an increasingly private-
oriented governance model for the sustainability of socio-environmental systems. 
 
5.5.3. The Absent Citizen: New Actors and Grey Accountability 
 
Needless to say, the transfer of water control and delivery from the public to 
the private sector involves a change in the choreographies of power and control. With 
political and public involvement waning, the power of the citizen is reduced. 
Moreover, to the extent that water is turned into money and capital, and water users 
into water customers who pay for water (rather than being citizens entitled to access 
to water), the choreographies of political power around water are fundamentally 
overhauled. Principles of business secrecy, absence of participation, non-transparent 
decision-making procedures and the like characterise the privatised organisation of   60
the water sector. Although a vital and local good, the decision-making frameworks are 
taken away from local or regional political control and relegated to executive 
boardrooms of global companies. This leads to autocratic forms of water governance 
and regulation with limited or absent democratic control. 
At the same time has the proliferation of regulatory bodies and systems of 
governance associated with the hydrosocial cycle, at local, national, or international 
scales, contributed to the emergence of a ￿thick￿ regulatory structure, at least in 
developed countries, with ambiguously defined responsibilities and an imprecisely 
defined accountability. Depending on the geographical scale of organisation or on the 
particular institutional embedding of the water companies, a differing set of actors is 
involved in the decision-making procedures. The choreography of ￿stake-holder￿ 
participation is uneven and unequal and, in many instances, operating outside 
traditional political democratic channels (see below). While some actors are well 
represented in some settings, they are excluded from others; still others remain totally 
absent from the arenas of power where fundamental decisions are made.  
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6. Cracks in the Mirror: the contradictions of water privatisation. 
 
 
6.1. Water: Public Good or Private Commodity? 
 
The recent shift towards turning H2O into a global commodity has profound 
implications on the social and political meaning and cultural valuation of water.  First 
of all, water is turned into profits and capital accumulation by private or public/private 
institutions. Supplying water becomes hereby a means to achieve economic goalposts: 
economic growth and profit maximisation. To the extent that private companies do 
this, water-related activities become just a strategic element within a predominantly 
corporate strategy of companies that are becoming rapidly multi-utility and 
international. Second, non-economic uses and functions of water have then to be 
regulated by governmental institutions that often face serious opposition, conflict, or 
other constraints in the face of powerful private agencies. Moreover, it becomes 
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to integrate water policies within a wider 
urban, social, or economic policy that would involve cross-subsidisation, alternative 
uses of water, or a socially stratified policy. Third, this shift inevitably entails a 
change in the geometry of social power. Private actors and companies become much 
more powerful voices in strategic water-related decisions, at the expense of other civil 
society organisations or of the state. Fourth, while the water cycle operates on 
temporal rhythms that are part of the larger environmental system, it is nevertheless 
increasingly forced to operate under the standard discounting periods of corporate 
strategists and of economic cycles. Fifth, the privatised nature of crucial parts of the 
water cycle diminishes the transparency of decision-making procedures and limits 
access to data and information that could permit other social groups to acquire the 
relevant information on which to base views, decisions, and options. Finally, water 
production and distribution becomes incorporated into an increasingly global 
economy in which investment flows, financial capital markets, and investment 
decisions shape the contours in which the urban water economy operate. In sum, the 
shift from public good to private commodity alters the choreography of power 
through which the urban hydrosocial cycle in organised.  
 
 
6.2. The Supply/Demand Nexus and the Investment/Pricing Conundrum 
 
At a moment when the price signal becomes a central organising principle of 
water markets, and in a context of relatively fixed supplies, demand management 
becomes tricky business. Monopolistic market control that is inevitably associated 
with water supply networks demands a strong price and investment regulation by the 
State (benchmarking) or other governmental agencies. In addition, efforts to reduce 
water consumption for environmental reasons are countered by cost-recovery 
requirements that hinge on price setting and produced quantities. Invariably, water 
companies are operating in the two-pronged wedge of price-setting regulatory systems 
on the one hand and costly technological/organisational investments to enhance 
productivity on the other. The triad investment/price/supply becomes very difficult to 
manage, particularly in a context of increasing pressures to reduce demand. Most 
evidence suggests a continuing tendency to increase supply despite rhetorical 
attention to demand management. The costly introduction of water saving 
technologies is, at best, slow, while major efforts are made to increase supply despite   62
often-formidable opposition. It is becoming abundantly clear that the price signal is 
insufficient to regulate the allocation and efficient use of a resource like water. 
Particularly when ecological or cultural aspects play an increasingly important role, 
the regulation of which demands political rather than economic instruments.  
 
 
6.3. Socio-spatial Struggle over Water   
 
The twin tension between continuing increasing demand for urban water on 
the one hand and the mounting pressure to allocate water to other functions on the 
other has proliferated socio-spatial tensions and conflict over water abstraction, water 
allocation, and water use. These conflicts can take a variety of forms, ranging from a 
growing social differentiation within the city in terms of water consumption, conflicts 
over urban versus agricultural, industrial, or ecological use, to conflicts between 
resource extraction areas and urban consumption areas (reflected in conflicts over 
new reservoirs or dam constructions). In addition, the globalisation of water 
companies signals a strategy in which local waters, turned into capital, are 
geographically re-allocated to other places and cities. Invariably, the outcome of these 
struggles and conflicts is expressive of the uneven power relations that infuse the 
organisation of the hydrosocial cycle.  
 
 
6.4. Water and Market risk: The Globalisation of Water and Uneven 
Development 
 
To the extent that water companies operate increasingly as private economic 
actors, they are also increasingly subject to standard market risks. While providing a 
fundamental and essential service, the economic survival of water operations is not 
necessarily guaranteed. Take-overs, disinvestments, geographical re-allocation, 
bankruptcies, inefficient operations, political risk, and the like are of course endemic 
to a private market economy. In fact, this uncertainty and fluidity is exactly what 
market dynamics are supposed to produce, i.e. to weed out under-performing 
companies, and to re-allocate economic resources from less to more profitable 
activities. This raises particular questions with respect to the long-term sustainability 
of market-based urban water supply systems. In absence of strong incentives to 
enhance productivity or efficiency, and given the high cost and long time horizon of 
fixed capital investments in water infrastructure, private companies may fail to keep 
water systems running efficiently. This would, in the medium term, lead to a situation 
in which the State (at whatever level) has to get involved again in the water sector in 
more direct ways. There is a tendency to leave the network/infrastructure part of 
urban water networks to the public sector, while profitable operational and private 
companies secure managerial activities. This entails an indirect subsidy of the private 
sector by the state and, in market terms, distorts the operation of the market. In fact, in 
a context in which risk of failure of water supply is too dramatic to contemplate, the 
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7. Strategies for achieving universal access to clean water. 
 
The concluding section shall outline the dimensions of a series of strategies 
and possible avenues for broadening access to clean water.  
 
7.1. Thinking out of the Water Box: Social Power and Water 
 
The hydrosocial cycle and its operation cannot be understood, let alone 
managed, as a separate entity, independent from other political, socio-economic, or 
environmental considerations. In fact, blinkered attention to water in itself, in 
isolation from other dimensions of development runs the risk of missing completely 
the key processes through which access to and exclusion from access to water is 
organised. In this section, we shall set out a number of key themes and issues that 
cannot and should not be ignored if questions of access to water are to be addressed 
effectively.  
Water access and social power are closely intertwined. Powerful social groups 
never die of thirst. It is the politically excluded, socially marginalised and/or 
economically poor that suffer most dramatically from problematic water access. 
Water access, therefore, is first and foremost a question of entitlements, of property 
rights, and of rights to access. Legal and institutional arrangements that guarantee 
property rights, and entitlements to access are, consequently, a vital foundation to 
guarantee sustainable access to a sufficient bundle of environmental resources that 
would permit individual and collective survival. Such environmental entitlements are 
not automatic but need to be arranged, legally enshrined and institutionally embedded. 
Such entitlements are a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition to guarantee universal 
access to water. It is of course exactly in the controversies over entitlements that 
social power choreographies become most clearly expressed. Environmental social 
conflicts invariably unfold exactly over the structure of and social inequalities 
associated with entitlements.  
It has to be recognised, therefore, that water flows ￿ like other resources ￿ are 
eminently political and need to be addressed in these terms. While managerial, 
technological, and organisation principles matter, it is ultimately the forms of 
political-economic power and its expression through the hydrosocial cycle that shapes 
mechanisms of access to and exclusion from access to water. It is absolutely vital that 
it is recognised that existing entitlement relations are socially and politically produced 
and maintained, and, consequently, do not derive from existing ￿natural￿ conditions. 
Particular social groups lack access to water not because of real or alleged water 
scarcities, but because of differential entitlements associated with differential power 
relations.   
  Adequate consideration of water issues, consequently, has to be sensitive to 
the sources and mechanisms of reproduction of these power relations. Although 
gender, ethnic, and political power relations are clearly of eminent importance, the 
vital power relationship through which access to and exclusion from access to water is 
organised is undoubtedly money and capital. Indeed, whether irrigation systems, 
dams, or urban water supply systems are considered, such infrastructures are always 
necessarily articulated with and organised through major capital investment. The key 
characteristic of such investments is that they are usually long-term, large-scale, and 
offer relatively low returns. The central question, therefore, remains one of access to 
sufficiently large amounts of investment capital on the one hand, and the power to 
decide on the allocation and management of such investment. Or in other words, it is   64
the commodity form of water, and the politics around its production and distribution, 
that shapes conditions of access.  
 
   
7.2.  Commodification, Privatisation, Public, Private? 
 
As discussed above, commodification of water has been part and parcel of 
modern development, of modern irrigation, and of the urbanisation of water. It is, 
vital, therefore to recognize the commodified form of water on the one hand and to 
differentiate ￿commodification￿ from ￿privatisation￿. Of course, transforming H2O 
into a useful ￿thing￿ requires remodelling and re-organising the socio-hydrological 
cycle such that it serves particular socio-physical ends (irrigation, recreation, 
sanitation, etc￿.). The resulting hydrosocial cycle is embedded in and organised 
through the commodification of water. The central issue, then, is one that revolves 
around a) the allocation and control over investment capital, b) the ownership of the 
infrastructure and of water, and c) the distribution of the capital and of the socialised 
waters produced with it.  
A considerable discussion has emerged over the past two decades or so that 
revolved exactly around the question of commodification and the structures of 
ownership. A common misunderstanding is to equate public ownership with free 
goods and with a non-commodified form of service delivery. This is of course 
incorrect. Irrespective of the public or private nature of service delivery, large-scale 
water distribution (in the form of irrigation or urban water) is fully commodified and 
has been so for a long time. The vital question, therefore, is one of who pays for the 
investment cost and for the water, and this is of course an eminently political-
economic question. Large-scale urban water infrastructures demand large capital 
investments. The provision of such capital has to be a central concern. In addition, 
decisions about investment priorities are also centrally important. Both issues are of 
course directly related to the source of capital on the one hand, and the distribution of 
the returns of that capital investment on the other. While the cost of investment is 
usually known and fairly easy to calculate, the question of capital provision and of 
who the beneficiaries of such capital investment are is an entirely political issue and, 
therefore, a question of political and public choice.  
  The latter two concerns cannot be addressed independently from ownership 
rules and allocation and distribution of decision powers. It is here that a vital 
distinction appears between private and public sector involvement. In a purely 
privatised environment, investment decisions are decided by considerations of 
profitability. This requires, on the one hand, the exclusive right to appropriate and 
distribute water and the right to set the price of water such that capital investment and 
a normal return on capital investment is possible on the other. This of course 
necessarily limits the range of private investment decisions to those that are directly 
profitable. Private sector organisation of water delivery, therefore, is independent of 
(and cannot be otherwise) social, environmental, or political needs and requirements. 
A public organisation of water supply and delivery can (and generally does) distribute 
investment capital and the return on investment capital in politically and/or socially 
motivated ways. Both investment flows and the structure of returns are embedded 
within an arrangement of redistribution in which the key issues are associated with 
decision of who pays and who benefits or, in other words, is subject to social and 
political negotiation. Such redistribution processes always entails socio-spatial flows 
from certain social groups to others, and from some places to other places. For   65
example, when a developed country offers development aid to a developing country 
for a water project it is a mere redistribution of capital from the developed world 
(through the intermediary of taxation which normally results in richer segments of 
society contributing relatively more than poorer ones) to the developing world. 
Depending on the political choice of allocation of such capital, different social groups 
will receive different levels of capital gains from such investments. Of course, to the 
extent that a return on capital is demanded (in the form of interest, for example), 
different social groups in the receiving country will also to have to contribute to this 
in differential ways.  
  In addition, as Karen Bakker (Bakker 2003) pointed out, water is an un-
cooperative commodity. For a number of fairly evident reasons (bulky, non-
substitutable, heavy, socially and economically contested, monopolistic, requiring 
long-term fixed investment), it is indeed not evident to make water subject to pure 
market logic. Recent experiences with water privatisation experiments have shown 
abundantly that turning water services into profitable and socially acceptable 
businesses is not an easy task. Moreover, demands for full cost recovery of water 
related activities reduce the possibilities for cross-financing and cross-subsidisation. 
The very term of ￿Full Cost  Recovery￿ is of course an oxymoron. It is of course 
evident that all investment project costs￿ need to be recovered by someone 
somewhere. The key question is really a political one, that is who will be responsible 
for the recovery of what kind of costs. When full cost recovery is discussed in the 
context of water projects, it invariably refers to view that water projects should be 
self-sufficient, i.e. that the cost of investment should be born completely out of water 
rates, i.e. that cost recovery is organised via water consumers. This of course limits 
the possibilities of cross-subsidisation to managing the tariff structure of water 
delivery in a particular re-distributive manner. It precludes subsidies and, thus, the 
financing of projects from local, regional, national tax revenues or, through 
development aid, from tax revenues raised elsewhere. Rates and direct or indirect 
taxation are the only possible forms for financing water projects. A narrowly defined 
Full Cost Recovery principle precludes using tax revenue for water projects. 
However, this has been the only way through which successful development of large 
scale water works with comprehensive was achieved or large irrigation schemes were 
implemented in the developed world. There is no evidence that this will be any 
different in the developing world. Mobilising tax revenues permits mobilising 
resources obtained from elsewhere of from other activities into other, collectively 
desirable, ones. Therefore, the narrow definition of Full Cost Recovery needs to be 
replaced by a much wider social and political-economic understanding, one that 
permits systemic forms of re-distribution of financial resources. 
  In sum, questions of investment in collective commodities like water are never 
independent of question of (re-)distribution. To the extent that the water economy is 
publicly or privately organised (or a mixture of both), these modalities of 
redistribution will be organised differently. While we have argued above that uneven 
access to water is primarily a question of economic or monetary power (and the lack 
thereof for large numbers of people in the developing world), achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals for water necessarily implies a major redistribution 
of capital resources. Guaranteeing access to clean and safe water for the 1.3 billion 
people who do not have access will necessitate the transfer of considerable amounts 
of investment capital whose return will have to be carried by the more wealthy 
sections of the world￿s population. This, of course, is independent of the question of 
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privately organised. The latter question is one of effective management. Around the 
world, both public and private (or mixed) companies have proven that they can be 
effective and efficient. However, the public/private debate should not overshadow (as 
it has done over the past decades) the question of the origin of the required 
investments to secure access to water. The private sector, because of the structural 
requirement for a normal return (profit) on investment, cannot and will not guarantee 
access to water to social groups with insufficient effective buying power (or, in some 
cases, willingness to pay) or investment in projects with an uncertain return. The only 
solution that can provide a mass solution is one based on subsidies and, thus, on 
redistribution of capital and income. Moreover, a public organisation of investment 
and of distribution permits considering a much wider range of technological, 
organisation, and managerial options. In many cities in the developing world, a 
thriving small-scale private economy of water delivery exists. While currently mainly 
operating through informal, unregulated, and often-shady forms of organisation, these 
micro-businesses show that alternative technological and organisational systems for 
water delivery are socio-economically sustainable. 
 
The key issue therefore is not about whether or not water is or should be a 
commodity or commoditised. Water is of course a commodity to the extent that 
delivering the right volume of water of the right quality to the right place (whether 
potable or irrigation water) requires major investments of capital and labour and these 
have to be made available and paid for. The central concern is of course one of who 
will pay for what part of the hydro-social circulation process. Adequate and reliable 
access of water for those who lack access will require a major transfer of capital and 
systematic and sustained cross-subsidisation. It is exactly the recognition of water as a 
commodity that permits effective cross-subsidisation. While inter-spatial and inter-
social cross-subsidisation is an absolute necessity if the Millennium goals are to be 
taken seriously, this should be considered separately from the private or public 
character of the management of water services understood in a narrow sense. 
However, the question of subsidisation and cross-subsidisation is of necessity a 
political one in which clear social, political, and economic choices have to be made. 
This political question needs to be addressed at local, national, and trans-national 
levels. Cross-subsidisation and subsidisation of investment does indeed require 
embedding issues of water access and distribution within appropriate institutional 
frameworks that discuss democratically and openly such questions of distribution. In 
fact, in the same way as a decision to privatise and fence-off water services (and to 
insist on its Full Cost Recovery) is an eminently political one (and often imposed by 
transnational organisations on developing countries), so is the issues of cross-
subsidisation. Indeed, if the above argument is correct, then the question of who 
decides on both investment and distribution becomes an eminently political question, 
and one that relates directly to issues of democracy and of the distribution of political 
power. To the extent than no one has ever voted to starve of thirst, political 
empowerment is a vitally important part to achieve a more equitable and sustainable 
distribution of water. And this is what we shall turn to next. 
  
 
7.3. Democracy and Political Power 
 
It is now widely accepted that systems of governing are undergoing rapid change 
(Commission_of_the_European_Communities 2001), (Le GalŁs 2002), (Swyngedouw   67
2005). Although the degree of change and the depth of impact are still contested, it is 
beyond doubt that the 19
th/20
th century political formations of articulating the 
state/civil society relationship through different forms of representative democracy, 
which vested power in hierarchically structured transcendental state-forms, is 
complemented by a proliferating number of new institutional forms of governing that 
exhibit rather different characteristics (Jessop 1995) (Kooiman 1995) (Kooiman 
2003). In other words, the Westphalian state-order that matured in the 20
th century in 
the form of the liberal-democratic state, organised at local, often also regional, and 
national scales, has begun to change in important ways, resulting in new forms of 
governmentality, characterised by a new articulation between state-like forms (such 
as, for example, the EU, public private partnerships, stakeholder forms of 
participatory governance and the like), civil society organisations, and private market 
actors (Brenner et al. 2003).  In the water sector, the emergence of new forms of 
governance, with their particular configurations of participation, has been clearly 
identified (Swyngedouw, Page, and Kaika 2002). NGOs, international bodies like the 
World Bank or the European Union, national governments, and the like advocate new 
principles of good governance in the water sector, based on stakeholder participation, 
that brings together state, civil society, and private economy actors together in 
presumably horizontally organised, participatory, transparent, and networked forums 
and institutional organizations.  
While the traditional state-form in liberal democracies is theoretically and 
practically articulated through forms of political citizenship which legitimises state 
power by means of it being vested within the political voice of the citizenry, the 
newly advocated forms of water governance exhibit a rather fundamentally different 
articulation between power and citizenship and, consequently, constitutes a new form 
of governmentality. As Schmitter (Schmitter 2002):52 defines it:    
 
Governance is a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of 
problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory 
and binding decisions by negotiating with each other and cooperating in the 
implementation of these decisions 
 
Paquet ((Pacquet 2001), see also (Hamel 2002)) defines governance as 
 
The newly emerging models of action result from the concerted combination of 
social actors coming form diverse milieus (private, public, civic) with the 
objective to influence systems of action in the direction of their interests. (my 
translation)  
 
What we observe today is not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty 
and planning capacities, but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of 
government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. 
NGOs, transnational organisations and the like), that indicate fundamental 
transformations in statehood and a renewed relation between state and civil society 
actors￿ (Lemke 2002):50.  This ￿destatisation￿ (Jessop 2002) of a series of former 
state domains and their transfer to civil society organisations or the private market 
sector redefines the state/civil society relationship through the formation of new forms 
of Governance-beyond-the-State. This encompasses a threefold re-organisation 
(Swyngedouw 1997). First is the externalisation of state functions through 
privatisation and de-regulation (and decentralisation). Second is the up-scaling of   68
governance whereby the national state increasingly delegates regulatory and other 
tasks to other and higher scales or levels of governance (such as the EU, IMF, WTO, 
and the like), and, third is the down-scaling of governance to ￿local￿ practices and 
arrangements that create greater local differentiation combined with a desire to 
incorporate new social actors in the arena of governing.   
These three processes of re-arrangement of the relationship between state, 
civil society and market, simultaneously re-organise the arrangements of governance 
as new institutional forms of Governance-beyond-the-State are set up and become 
part of the system of governing, of organising the ￿conduct of conduct￿. This 
restructuring is embedded in a consolidating neo-liberal ideological polity. The latter 
combines a desire to politically construct the market as the preferred social institution 
of resource mobilisation and allocation, a critique of the ￿excess￿ of state associated 
with Keynesian welfarism, and a social engineering of the social in the direction of 
greater individualised responsibility (Harvey 2005). Of course, this scalar re-
organisation of the state and the associated emergence of a neo-liberal Governance-
beyond-the-State redefine in fundamental ways the state/civil society relationship. 
Ironically, while these new forms of governance are often advocated and mobilised by 
NGOs and other civil organizations speaking for the disempowered or socially 
excluded (Carothers, Barndt, and Al-Sayyid 2000), these actors often fail to see how 
these instruments are an integral part of the consolidation of an imposed and 
authoritarian neo-liberalism, celebrating the virtues of marke discipline, self-managed 
risk, prudence, and self-responsibility (Castel 1991), (Burchell 1996), (Dean 1999). 
To the extent that ￿participation￿ is invariably mediated by ￿power￿ (whether 
political, economic, gender, or cultural) among participating ￿holders￿, between levels 
of governance/government and between governing institutions, civil society, and 
encroaching market power, the analysis and understanding of shifting relations of 
power is a central concern. Since it is impossible within the remit of this paper to 
exhaust the possible theorisations and perspectives on social and political power, we 
focus on the principles that fundamentally shape individuals￿ or social groups￿ 
position within the polity and that articulate their respective (but interrelated) power 
positions vis-￿-vis governing institutions on the one hand, and within civil society, on 
the other. In particular, in what follows, we take the theoretical and practical 
yardsticks of what constitutes democratic government together with the practices 
associated with arrangements of Governance-beyond-the-State commonly observed in 
the formation of new institutions of water governance around the world. 
 
Whilst in pluralist democracy, the political entitlement of the citizen is 
articulated via the twin condition of ￿national￿ citizenship on the one hand, and the 
entitlement to political participation in a variety of ways (but, primarily via a form of 
(constitutionally or otherwise) codified representational democracy) on the other, 
network based forms of governance do not (yet) have codified rules and regulations 
that shape or define participation and identify the exact domains or arenas of power 
(Hajer 2003). As Beck (Beck 1999: 41) argues, these practices are full of 
￿unauthorized actors￿. While such absence of codification potentially permits and 
elicits socially innovative forms of organisation and of governing, it also opens up a 
vast terrain of contestation and potential conflict that revolves around the exercise of 
(or the capacity to exercise) entitlements and institutional power. The status, inclusion 
or exclusion, legitimacy, system of representation, scale of operation, and internal or 
external accountability of such groups or individuals often take place in non-
transparent, ad-hoc, and context-dependent ways and differ greatly from those   69
associated with pluralist democratic rules and codes. While the democratic lacunae of 
pluralist liberal democracy are well known, the procedures of democratic governing 
are formally codified, transparent, and easily legible. The modus operandi of 
networked associations is much less clear. Moreover, the internal power choreography 
of systems of Governance-beyond-the-State is customarily led by coalitions of 
economic, socio-cultural, or political elites (Swyngedouw, Page, and Kaika 2002). 
Therefore, the re-scaling of policy transforms existing power geometries, resulting in 
a new constellation of governance articulated via a proliferating maze of opaque 
networks, fuzzy institutional arrangements, ill-defined responsibilities, and ambiguous 
political objectives and priorities. In fact, it is the state that plays a pivotal and often 
autocratic role in transferring competencies (and consequently for instantiating the 
resulting changing power geometries) and in arranging these new networked forms of 
governance. The democratic fallacies of the pluralist ￿democratic￿ state are 
compounded by the expansion of the realm of ￿governing￿ through the proliferation of 
such asymmetric governance-beyond-the-state arrangements. In fact, when assessing 
the formal requirements of pluralist democracy against the modes of arrangements of 
Governance-beyond-the-State, the contradictory configurations of these networked 
associations come to the fore and show the possible perverse effects or, at least, the 
contradictory character of many of these shifts. That is what we turn to next. 
 
7.3.1 Entitlement and Status 
 
The first question revolves around ￿entitlement￿ and ￿status￿. While the 
concept of (stake)￿holder￿ is inclusive and presumably exhaustive, the actual concrete 
forms of governance are necessarily constrained and limited in terms of who can, is, 
or will be allowed to participate. Hence, status and assigning or appropriating 
entitlement to participate, is of prime importance. In particular, assigning ￿holder￿ 
status to an individual or social group is not neutral in terms of exercising power. In 
most cases, entitlements are conferred upon participants by those who already hold a 
certain power or status. Of course, the degree to which mobilisations of this kind are 
successful depends, inter alia, on the degree of force and/or power such groups or 
individuals can garner, and on the willingness of the existing participants to agree to 
include them. In addition, the terms of participation may vary significantly from mere 
consultation to the right to vote. Needless to say, status within the participatory rituals 
co-determines effective power positionality. More fundamentally, while political 
citizenship-based entitlements are (formally) inclusive (at least at a national level) and 
are based on a ￿one person one vote￿ rule, holder entitlements are invariably 
predicated upon willingness to accept groups as participants on the one hand, but also 
on willingness-to-participate on the other. The latter of course depends crucially on 
the perceived or real position of power that will be accorded to incumbent 
participants. In a context in which, partly through the erosion of political power 
(compared with other forms of power) and partly through an emerging more 
problematic relationship between state and civil society, many individuals and social 
groups have fully or partially ￿opted-out￿ of political participation and chosen either 
other forms of political action or plain rejection. 
 
7.3.2 The structure of representation 
 
Second, in addition to decisions over entitlement to participate, the structure of 
representation is of crucial importance. While pluralist democratic systems exhibit   70
clear and mutually agreed forms of representation, ￿holder￿ participation suffers from 
an ill-defined and diffused notion of an actual system of representation (Edwards 
2002). Various groups and individuals participating in networks of ￿governance￿ have 
widely diverging mechanisms of deciding on representation and organising feedback 
to their constituencies. To the extent that it is primarily civil society organisations that 
participate in governance, their alleged insertion into grass-roots civil society power, 
is much more tenuous than is generally assumed. In fact, it proves to be extremely 
difficult to disentangle the lines of representation (and mechanisms of consultation 
and accountability that are directly related to the form of representation) through 
which groups (or individuals) claim entitlement to ￿holder￿ status (and, hence, to 
participation) or are assigned ￿holder￿ status. This, of course, opens up a space of 
power for the effective participants within the organisation that is not at all, or only 




Thirdly and directly related to the above, the mechanisms and lineages of 
accountability are radically redrawn in arrangements of Governance-beyond-the-State 
(Rhodes 1999), (Rakodi 2003). Again, while a democratic polity has more or less 
clear mechanisms for establishing accountability, ￿holder￿ representation 
fundamentally lacks explicit lines of accountability. In fact, accountability is assumed 
to be internalised within the participating groups through their insertion into 
(particular segments) of civil society (through which their holder status is defined and 
legitimised). However, given the diffuse and opaque systems of representation, 
accountability is generally very poorly, if at all, developed. In other words, effective 
representation has to be assumed, is difficult to verify, and practically impossible to 
challenge. The combined outcome of this leads to often more autocratic, non-
transparent systems of governance that ￿ as institutions ￿ wield considerable power 
and, thus, assign considerable, albeit internally uneven power, to those who are 




This brings the argument directly to the centrality of legitimation. The 
mechanisms of legitimation of policies and/or regulatory interventions become very 
different from those of representational pluralist democracy. To the extent that 
legitimation does not result from the organisation of entitlement, representation, and 
accountability, these news forms of governance face considerable internal and 
external problems with respect to establishing legitimacy. In fact, this has been a 
long-running problem for many of the new forms of governance, particularly as 
coercion and the legitimate use of coercive technologies remain largely, although by 
no means exclusively, with the state. Legitimacy depends, therefore, more crucially 
on the linguistic coding of the problems and of strategies of action. This is particularly 
pertinent in a policy environment that, at the best of times, only reflects a partial 
representation of civil society. As Kooiman notes, governance implies ￿a linguistic 
coding of problem definitions and patterns of action￿  (cited in (Grote and Gbikpi 
2002: 13)). This view parallels recent post-modern theories of political consensus 
formation (see (Hajer 2003)), which implies a reliance on the formation of discursive 
constructions (through the mobilisation of discourse alliances) that produces an 
image, if not an ideology, a representation of a desirable good, while, at the same   71
time, ignoring or silencing alternatives. These discursive or representational strategies 
have become powerful mechanisms for producing hegemony and, with it, legitimacy. 
The latter, of course, remains extremely fragile as it can be continuously undermined 
by means of counter-hegemonic discourses and the mobilisation of a deconstructionist 
apparatus for deciphering the codings of power that are imbedded in legitimising 
discourses.  
 
7.3.5 Scales of Governance 
 
Fifth, the geographical scale or level at which forms of governance-beyond-
the-state are constituted and their internal and external relational choreographies of 
participation/exclusion are clearly significant.  When Governance-beyond-the-State 
involves processes of ￿jumping scales￿ (Smith 1984)  -- that means the transfer of 
policy domains to sub-national or transnational forms of governance --  the 
choreography of actors changes as well. As Hajer contends, scale jumping is a vital 
strategy to gain power or influence in a multi-scalar relational organisation of 
networks of governance (Hajer 2003: \179). For example, where national urban policy 
increasingly replaced ￿local public-private partnerships￿, the types of social actor and 
their positions within the geometries of power changed as well. In other words, up-
scaling or down-scaling is not socially neutral as new actors emerge and consolidate 
their position in the process, while other are excluded or become more marginal 
(Swyngedouw 1996b).  In sum, with changing scalar configurations, new groups of 
participants enter the frame of governance or re-enforce their power position, while 
others become or remain excluded.  
 
7.3.6 Orders of Governance 
 
Finally, as both Kooiman (Kooiman 2000) and Jessop (Jessop 2002) attest, a 
clear distinction, at least theoretically, has to be made between meta-, first, and 
second order governance. Meta-governance refers to the institutions or arrangements 
of governance where the ￿grand principles￿ of governmentality are defined. For 
example, the European Union, the World Trade Organization, or the G-8 meetings are 
textbook examples of vehicles of meta-governance. First order governance is 
associated with codifying and formalising these principles, while second order 
governance refers to the sphere of actual implementation. In terms of political and 
social framing of policies, there is a clear hierarchy between these orders of 
governance, which can and do operate at all spatial levels. However, the 
choreography of participation, including entitlement, status, and accountability, varies 
significantly depending on the ￿order￿ of the governing network.  
 
 
  In sum, a considerable effort has to be made to tease out the democratic 
content of the new forms of institutional organization through which water projects, 
particularly in the developing world, or proposed, developed, implemented, and 
managed. Two key concerns are of central importance: 
 
a)  The alleged ￿excess￿ of state.  
 
The call for new forms of water governance is primarily resulting from a 
perceived state failure (see above). However, this ￿failure￿ needs to be   72
carefully considered. Although there are instances of state failure, the state has 
also ￿succeeded￿ on many terrains and in many countries. Moreover, the state 
is not disappearing, but will remain a key interlocutor in assuring governance 
and providing investment capital. A continued effort, therefore, needs to be 
made to assure further democratisation of the state and the improvement of the 
democratic forms of government and its accompanying institutions. It is 
vitally important, therefore, to focus attention on democratising the state￿s 
water institution, rather than replacing them with new and decidedly unproven 
(in terms of democratic content) forms of governance-beyond-the-state. 
 
b)  The alleged democratic nature of ￿good participatory governance￿ 
 
The non-normative and socially innovative models of governance as non-
hierarchical, networked and (selectively) inclusive forms of governmentality, 
cannot be sustained uncritically. While governance promises, and on occasion, 
delivers a new relationship between the act of governing and society, and, 
thus, re-articulates and re-organises the traditional tension between the 
realisation of the Rousseauian ideal in immanent forms of governing on the 
one hand, and the imposition of a transcendental Hobbesian leviathan on the 
other, there are also significant counter-tendencies. In particular, as discussed 
above, tensions arise between: 
-  The possibilities and promises of enhanced democratisation through 
participatory governance versus the actualities of non-representational 
forms of autocratic elite technocracy. 
-  The extension of ￿holder￿ participation as partially realised in some new 
forms of governances versus the consolidation of beyond-the-state arenas 
of power-based interest intermediation. 
-  The improved transparency associated with horizontal networked 
interdependencies versus the grey accountability of hierarchically 
articulated and non-formalised and procedurally legitimised, associations 
of governance. 
 
These tensions arise particularly prevalent and acute in the context of the 
processes of re-scaling of levels of governance. The up-scaling, down-scaling, 
and externalisation of functions traditionally associated with the scale of the 
national state have resulted in the formation of institutions and practices of 
governance that all express the above contradictions. This is clearly evident in 
the context of the formation (and probably implementation) of a wide array of 
new forms of water governance. The processes of constructing these new 
choreographies of governance are associated with the rise to prominence of 
new social actors, the consolidation of the presence of others, the exclusion or 
diminished power position of groups that were present in earlier forms of 
government and the continuing exclusion of other social actors who have 
never been included. The new ￿gestalt of scale￿ of governance has 
undoubtedly given a greater voice and power to some organisations (of a 
particular kind, i.e. those who accept playing according to the rules set from 
within the leading elite networks). However, it has also consolidated and 
enhanced the power of groups associated with the drive towards marketisation, 
and diminished the participatory status of groups associated with social-
democratic or anti-privatisation strategies.    73
 
 
7.1. Creative Dissent ￿ Productive Conflict ￿ Mediating Power 
 
Enhancing the democratic content of water governance does not, therefore, rely on 
avoiding conflict, marginalising dissent, or ignoring power inequalities, but 
recognising these conditions and processes. Dissent and conflict, can, if institutionally 
and democratically embedded, produce productive and creative solutions for 
intractable problems. Power relations and differences have to be acknowledged and 
taken into consideration. The latter, in turn, would permit articulating dissent and 
democratically embedding conflict. This is particularly important in the water sector 
where conflict, uneven power relations, and voices of dissent are the norm rather than 
the exception.  
This report (and many others) showed the inevitably contested nature of water 
production and allocation and the power relations associated with this. Conflict over 
water is unavoidable. Over the past few years, however, open and often-intense water 
conflicts of a variety of kind (over dams, water privatisation schemes, irrigation plans, 
and the like) have proliferated around the world. The intensification of open water 
conflicts signals, among others, an incapacity of the systems of governance and their 
institutional arrangements to bring dissent, conflict and power inequalities with the 
institutional configurations of governance and is often a sign of autocratic forms of 
governing that exclude, marginalise, or silences opposition rather than finding 
appropriate institutional settings for articulating difference.  
In sum, therefore, democratising institutions of water governance requires not less 
dissent or conflict, but arranging transparent and democratic institutions of water 
governance (at all scales) that are sensitive to existing power relations that permit 
exactly some social groups to exclude others, thereby intensifying and publicising (in 
the sense of making ￿public￿ in all its meanings) conflict, tension, and dissent.  
 
 
7.5 Financing the Millennium Development Goals 
 
Of course, ultimately, political democratisation and socially empowered 
governance can only deliver the desired outcome with a sufficient mobilisation of 
necessary financial resources. The financial needs required to reach the MDG 
objectives are indeed considerable. According to Agenda 21, the report of the 1992 
Rio Conference on Environment and Development, the estimated annual additional 
investment cost needed to achieve global water security was US$ 56 billion (see 
(Cosgrove and Rijsberman 2000)). However, more recent estimates suggest that a 
much more significant effort is needed. The World Water Vision Report (Cosgrove 
and Rijsberman 2000) estimates that in the run up to 2025, US$ 180 billion annually 
is required to achieve good water access for all. This includes an investment of US$ 
550 billion in dams and irrigation schemes to feed the growing world￿s population, 
assuming a 40% increase in world food production. The report also assumes a 1.5 
billion increase in population, half of whom will live in cities. Combined with 
existing deficiencies (1.5 billion) and ongoing rural to urban migration (0.5 billion), 
this would bring the total of people that need to be serviced to 3 billion. With a 
conservative estimate of US$ 50 a person for urban water supply and sanitation, the 
total cost would be nearly US$ 1.8 trillion. In addition to that, industrial water use will 
expand, while urgent replacement investment is required in the developed world and   74
in the former socialist states. The summary of total annual investment needs up to 
2025 (and compared to the actual situation in 1995) and their expected sources is 






Table 8. Annual Investment Requirements for Water Resources and Anticipated 
Sources of Investment 
_____________________________________________________________________
      
    B i l l i o n s   o f   U S $     S h a r e   ( % )  
   _____________________   _____________________ 
   1995   Vision      1995   Vision   
USE        2025          2025 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Agriculture   30-35       30    43-50           17 
 
Environment and  10-15      75      13-21        41 
Industry 
 
Water Supply and     30      75      38-43        41 
Sanitation 
 







National    
Public Sector    45-50      30
a       58-71       25   
 




Private Investors        4      48         5- 6        24 
 
Donors            9          12       12-13         6   
 
Total    70-80   180          100       100 
 
a This figure assumes an additional $20 billion in direct subsidies to the poor. 
 
Source: Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000   75
 
 
In addition to the quite staggering magnitude of the investment required, 70% 
of the total is expected to be raised by the private sector. This World Water Council 
report asserts that ￿private actors can thus provide the main source of infrastructure 
investment￿. The World Bank accepted this view, which furthered their push to 
privatization as the main means through which to elicit private sector participation 
(Pitman 2002). However, after some major difficulties (as exemplified by the cases of 
Atlanta, Cochabamba, Jakarta and Manila), many international operators are 
strategically withdrawing from major investments (Buenos Aires is the most recent 
example if this) (Gleick 2004). In a recent report of the World Panel on Financing 
Water Infrastructure (Camdessus Report) (Winpenny 2003), the modest contributions 
of the private sector to financing water projects were considered. The report 
concluded that ￿multilateral financial institutions will be the pillars of the new water 
financial architecture. They should do everything to reverse the recent decline in their 
water lending and make every effort to expand their use of guarantees and insurance￿ 
(Winpenny 2003). The latter would include establishing a ￿Devaluation Liquidity 
Backstop Facility￿. This rather fancy name refers to the establishment of an 
international public body that would ￿effectively guarantee the foreign loans and 
finance the additional debt service incurred from devaluation to be reimbursed by the 
authority responsible setting the tariffs￿ (Winpenny 2003). In straightforward 
language, this would de facto mean that private investment risk would transferred to 
the international public sector who would then recoup losses from the local publics in 
the developing country in case devaluation occurs. In other words, the public would 
carry the brunt of unfavourable national and international political economic 
conditions; this will hardly improve the situation of the poor and disempowered.  
 
As Amann-Blake attests, and confirmed by the findings in this report, 
￿through a review of the historical record [recent in case of the developing world; 
much longer in case of the developed world] we see that infrastructure ￿ was not 
primarily financed by the private sector and therefore questions why this would be 
different in developing countries today as they face rapid urbanisation, unstable 
economies, and population growth￿ (Amann-Blake 2006): 16. 
  
Indeed, even with privatisation, private sector participation in the water sector 
remains limited and the prospects for future private sector investment rather dim. This 
leaves no other alternative than public financing to cover the bulk of the required 
investment. It would be a mirage, if not worse, to believe or assert that the MDGs can 
be achieved on the basis of massively increased private sector investment in the water 
sector. It has not happened in the recent past despite great pressure on all actors, the 
results of the actually existing experiments are mixed to say the least, and the 
prospects for enhanced investment in context of total privatisation are not promising. 
Without massively enhanced national and international public support, the MDGs will 
remain an empty promise. The fundamental policy question that the world is faced 
with is whether this public investment will be channelled in direct investment in 
public utilities or through financial mechanisms to make operations safe and 
profitable for the private sector.   76
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